You Can't Think and Hit at the Same Time - Who you gonna believe?

A study was published in Pub Med (whatever that is) with that specific title which mimics Yogi Berra's famous quote and it got me thinking a bit about coaching theories and approaches.

You basically have to pick one of two choices -- the Yogi Berra, baseball traditionalist, empirical evidence approach ( they have been promoting this 'theory' since 1947 or thereabouts ) or the Bill Nye, The Science Guy, scientific evidence and proof approach.

I suppose you could pick and choose from both approaches as you wish, but that seems like it would leave you hopelessly confused

So do we go with Yogi....

from quoteinvestigator.com
You Can’t Think and Hit at the Same Time |:

How can you think and hit at the same time?” Yogi Berra once said, which like many of the quotes attributed to the former Yankees catcher, even the malapropisms, contains an essential truth. You can’t think and hit because there’s not time for both.

The evidence is not completely clear because Yogi himself has made confusing pronouncements about this saying. The earliest citation located by QI is an Associated Press newswire story dated August 1, 1947 [MCYB]:

'via Blog this'



...or The Bill Bye the Science Guy crowd -- who will not act until something is scientifically proven, peer  reviewed and accepted by the pocket-protector crowd.

from PubMed:
You Can't Think and Hit at the Same Time: Neu... [Front Neurosci. 2012] - PubMed - NCBI:

Abstract

Hitting a baseball is often described as the most difficult thing to do in sports. A key aptitude of a good hitter is the ability to determine which pitch is coming. This rapid decision requires the batter to make a judgment in a fraction of a second based largely on the trajectory and spin of the ball. When does this decision occur relative to the ball's trajectory and is it possible to identify neural correlates that represent how the decision evolves over a split second?

'via Blog this'

It seems to me that if you relied too much on science (not that there's anything wrong with that) you would have wasted 65 years waiting for an answer. To break the tie, we went to the two smartest guys we could find.

Both are also a scientists by nature so neither one would appear to have a built in pro-baseball guy bias.

from wikiwuote:
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Richard_Feynman

A great deal more is known than has been proved. 

I believe that a scientist looking at nonscientific problems is just as dumb as the next guy — and when he talks about a nonscientific matter, he will sound as naive as anyone untrained in the matter. 

Thanks Messrs. Einstein and Feyman. CASE CLOSED. Yogi wins. 

Baseball analyst blames rise in home runs on climate change

Give yourself a star if you guessed Tim McCarver.

I guess we can file this under "Stupid Stuff Tim McCarver Says". Good grief. At least he doesn't pretend to be an expert on the weather. I think Timmy needs a brain surgeon himself. I swear -- with some of the stuff this guy comes up with -- if they put his brain in a bird, it would fly backwards.

Maybe he's positioning himself for a spot on the Gore-McCarver 2016 Presidential campaign.

Too guys (over) filled with hot air. It's a match made in heaven.

Baseball analyst blames rise in home runs on climate change:

"Tim McCarver wrote "Baseball for Brain Surgeons and Other Fans," but he's not a real scientist, which is why it was a surprise to hear the national Fox announcer (and former catcher) opine that climate change is leading to more home runs. McCarver says "climactic changes" of the last 50 years are making the ball "carry farther than I remember," although he acknowledges it "hasn't been proven yet." It's certainly not better training, performance-enhancing drugs or McCarver's bad memory. It's the weather."

Sorry Timmy, you're not smarter than the average (polar) bear.

TIE GOES TO THE RUNNER...BASEBALL MYTH

"Tie goes to the runner" is a playground phrase used when there is no umpire to decide the call. It was used by kids to decide perceived ties in much the same way as "shooting odds or evens" or just deciding based on force of personality.

The rules seem to conflict on the batter/runner having to be conclusively safe or else he is considered out versus the forced runner having to be put out or he is safe because the forced runner has acquired rights as a base-runner. He's been declared safe previously, a batter/runner has not.

I believe that is the reason for the apparent discrepancy between the definition of what is an "out" as applied to the two types of runners.

When I umpire, there are no ties. And happily no appeals on arguments heard on safe/out decision. :)

The culture of the game generally dictates that when considering a batter-runner who hits a grounder that is going to be what umpires calla "whacker" or close play (tie?) at first base. Most umpires will "bang him out", employing the old umpires joke (I hope) "When in doubt, bang him out". Another favorite bromide from the blue school is "Call them out, you get home faster."

Most of the time, the culture of the game, or what's expected by the participants, is on your side if you bang the batter-runner out at first on the proverbial tie. The whole dugout is imploring the runner "Beat it out, beat it out" as he's hustling down the line. This indicates they understand that a tie is going to be an out. I caused a dugout full of freshman to pause and think once when I posed that question to them after I rung up a batter and they gave me the "Oh come on blue, doesn't the tie go to the runner?" I just aksed them, then why were you telling him he needed to "beat the throw".

They "got it" after that.

By the same token, if a base-runner is on and there is a close play on a pickoff play or play at a subsequent base, I think it's fair that any "doubt" that may be involved in the decision goes to the base-runner. The defense has to remove him from the base beyond a shadow of a doubt.

So initial batter-runner has to acquire the right to a base and then he acquires higher status and the defense has to beat the runner to the base via force-out or tag.

The game works out better that way. It's fair, understandable, reasonable and defensible.

Of course, a good umpire will never admit to doubt or any form of "mental coin-flipping". The good ones will say "I may be wrong, but I'm always certain."

According to at least one of the professional umpire schools, the rules makers distinctly and purposefully did not use the word "tie" in the rulebook as they neither anticipated one, nor wished to encourage one. Rather, the intended implication of "6.05j. Runner or base has to be tagged before the runner touches first base for an out" is not that a tie exists, but that the reverse is also true, that when a runner touches first prior to be tagged, he is safe."

Those who have researched the rulebook and intent say that nothing in the book is meant to convey the existence of a tie. Old myths, especially the one about tie goes to the runner, die hard.

---

Tie goes to the runner and other baseball rules myths:

I recently have been reading journalist Bruce Weber's book, As They See 'Em: A Fan's Travels in the Land of Umpires. It is a fun read, providing great insight into the history, politics, and nuances of umpiring. I was interested in it for the insight it may shed on the much-despised judge-umpire analogy, this time from the umpire perspective. I may write a book review on it, focusing on the analogy and what it teaches us about that.

For now, I wanted to mention one thing that caught my eye. As far back as Little League, we learned (and constantly repeated whenever there was a close play) that "the tie goes to the runner." Apparently, this is false. Rule 7.01 states that "A runner acquires the right to an unoccupied base when he touches it before he is out." Thus, the runner is out unless he beats the throw and/or tag to the base.

This is an interesting example of default rules and burdens of persuasion in action. The default is that the runner is out unless he affirmatively beats the throw. In a sense, the runner has the burden of proof that he is safe and his failure to meet his burden (his failure to beat the throw) means he is out. Weber does not get into the origins or rationale for the rule or the origins of the myth. But it is one more thing that umpires do that we do not understand.

----------

The Relevant Rules:

The rule you state, 6.05(j), states the tag must beat the
BATTER however, since according to rule 6.09(a,b) the batter
becomes a runner when they hit a fair ball or when a third
strike is not caught, 6.05(j) does not apply.

7.08(e) states that a RUNNER is out if he fails to reach
the next base before the tag, thus a tie is an out.

7.08(d) states that a RUNNER is out if he fails to retouch
his base after a ball is legally caught before the tag, thus
a tie is an out.

7.08(c) states that a RUNNER is out if he is tagged by a
live ball while off HIS base. His base refers to a base that
the runner has already earned provided he is not required to
give it up due to a force. So, the only time the tie goes to
the runner is when they are diving back to their base and a
tag is required.

The Enforcement Options - Application of the Rules:

So, what about other situations? Two basic rules are 7.01 and 7.08(c). They say that a runner becomes entitled to a base -- is safe -- when he touches a base before he is out, and that a runner is out if he is tagged when off his base.

---

Bruce reads 7.01 to mean that a runner is entitled to a
base -- and, therefore, only safe -- when he touches the base
before the act of putting the runner out. This would mean
that ties *never* go to runners -- not even at first.

However, you could read 7.01 to merely beg the question of
when a runner is out. After all, it doesn't say that you
are only safe if you touch the base before the *tag* -- it
says that you're safe if you touch the base before you're
*out*.

---

So, when is a runner out? One answer is, when he's tagged
while "off his base." If this is the rule -- 7.08(c) -- by
which a runner is out -- and I think it covers all
situations where a tag of the runner (as opposed to the
base) is required -- then the tie goes
to that runner, because if the runner is touching the base
when he is tagged, he is not "off his base" at the time of
the tag -- he's touching it. Furhter, he has touched it
before being out, satisfying 7.01, because there is no
other > rule by which this runner is out other than the
personal-tag-while-off-a-base rule.

It's not perfect, but I think the rules say that ties
generally go to runners unless it's a force-out at 2nd,
3rd, or Home, in which case, ties go to fielders. This would
mean a world in which the benefit of the doubt goes to
offensive players when running to first, returning to bases,
stealing bases, or trying for extra bases, but to defensive players
when going for force-outs. I like it.

The case of Runner v. Tag involves some statutory interpretation. Yes, it is clear that there are ties -- situations where it is beyond the ability of any observer (or, even, a hypothetical machine) to discern which came first.

It is equally clear that the rules do not contemplate ties or address them directly. But, we do have rules, and they say what they say even if they don't directly address ties. If there were a rule -- totally clear and not undermined by any other rule -- that said that a runner is
safe only when he touches the base before the tag, we would all probably agree that, under the rules, the tie does not in fact go to the runner but to the fielder.

These rules are a bit more murky than that, but they do seem to say that in some situations.

What we know for sure: There is a batter rule (6) and a runner rule (7).

There is overlap.
Batters become runners, or "batter-runners," until they are put out or the play in
which they became a runner otherwise ends. So, for the batter-runner, there are two rules -- 6 and 7, and both apply.

---

Rule 6.05(j) says a batter is out if, after a third strike or a fair ball, he or first base is tagged before he reaches first base. This would suggest that ties go to runners if they are batter-runners and the play is at first, but we have to consider other rules that could also apply.

Rule 7.08(e) says something different for runners who are forced to advance by reason of the batter becoming a runner:

That is, they are out unless they reach the next base before the tag. This suggests that the tie goes to the fielder on a force-out at 2nd, 3rd, or Home. (I don't think this rule applies to batter-runners, but I'm not a hundred percent positive.)

---

From the Hardball Times:

http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/blog_article/inside-the-rules-tie-goes-to-the-runner/

Thursday, November 04, 2010

Inside the rules: tie goes to the runner

Posted by David Wade

Many baseball fans, and possibly some players and coaches, believe that a baserunner who reaches first at the same time as the ball is safe. Those under that impression often will declare, magisterially and emphatically, that the 'tie goes to the runner.' However, that exact phrase doesn't actually exist anywhere in baseball's rules. While that may surprise some, it is also true that there is no mention of baserunner ties in major league baseball's rulebook in any manner. The question then is, do we take silence on the issue to mean we must reject the oft-cited assumption completely?

Here are the relevant rules in the MLB rulebook:

Rule 6.05 (j) A batter is out when, after a third strike or after he hits a fair ball, he or first base is tagged before he touches first base.

Rule 7.01 A runner acquires the right to an unoccupied base when he touches it before he is out. He is then entitled to it until he is put out, or forced to vacate it for another runner legally entitled to that base.

Rule 7.08 (e) Any runner is out when he or the next base is tagged before he touches the next base....


Explicit in those rules are two things. First, a runner is out if he is forced or tagged before reaching the base. The rulebook clearly shows that with the first and third examples. Conversely (and just as clearly shown) a runner is safe if reaching a base before being forced or tagged under rule 7.1. These rules are two sides of the same coin, for either the runner must beat the defense to the bag to be safe or the defender must beat the runner to the bag to record an out.

Missing in those rules are instructions for dealing with runner and defender reaching the bag simultaneously. The 'tie' lacks explanation. Some feel that no mention makes the tie benefiting the runner a myth, on par with misguided thinking that the hands are part of the bat, for example. However, closer inspection may show the reason why the 'tie goes to the runner' is such an age-old adage.

With no specific instruction on how to rule a tie, the umpire following only what is explicitly written in the code must assume ties simply do not exist, and many do just that. A common refrain among umpires seems to be that there are no ties on plays at bases. That interpretation means umpires are following the lead of Protestant Reformers and studying their rules sola scriptura. Subsequently, they must judge according only to the passages referenced above.

Unfortunately, such strict acceptance means calling a runner out or safe on an actual tie based on one instance of the rule while ignoring the other. To get around that, they argue that the ball either beats the runner or it doesn't, and the runner is subsequently either out or safe. While the former is questionable, the latter is correct. No matter how debatable a call may be in baseball, safe and out are still the only two choices.

One problem with the only-ball-or-runner-first answer is that a provision should be made for a tie and simply favor either the runner or the defender. All calls would still be mutually exclusive, depending only on which side benefited from some clear and final decision on ties. But, this hypothetical scenario would require those in authority to give weight to one instance in the rulebook over the other and make a slight modification in the wording in all references to outs at bases. That has not happened over the course of 100 years and seems unlikely in the future.

After eliminating that far-fetched solution, another problem still remains with umpires saying that the ball either beats the runner or it doesn't. That, of course, is an umpire's claim that a ball cannot reach a defender precisely when the runner touches the bag. That notion is much more problematic and real. We can look at horse racing for convincing photographic evidence that it is possible for two or more horses to reach the finish line at the same time, even after a race lasting two minutes or more. How, then, could it not be possible for a runner and defender to reach first base after a play lasting all of four seconds? It is possible, and any umpire that claims it is not has chosen to speak only where the scripture speaks.

Another option for umpires, which is to study the rules for intent and allow an implicit interpretation regarding ties, has its own problems as well. For, if an umpire admits it is possible for ball and runner to meet a base at the same time, they face a new dilemma. Is a tie an out or is it safe? Some umpires could put the onus on the defender to beat the runner and declare the runner safe if he reaches the base at the same time. They could reference a rule for such a call. Others, taking the opposite stance, could argue that they follow a rule as well, just a different one. Here are examples of such stances, with predictably conflicting results.

In this Q and A on MLB.com, major league crew chief Tim McClelland took the questions. When a reader asked about the 'tie going to runner,' he said that wording is not found and that "...the rule book does say that the runner must beat the ball to first base, and so if he doesn't beat the ball, then he is out." In this example, McClelland seems to invoke rule 7.1 while ignoring the other two, so he calls the runner out.

Tim McClelland's full comments:

I am an umpire for Little League. The coach told me that ties go to the runner. I said the batter has to beat the throw to first because there are no such thing as ties. Who is right?
-- L.M.F.

McClelland: That is exactly right. There are no ties and there is no rule that says the tie goes to the runner. But the rule book does say that the runner must beat the ball to first base, and so if he doesn't beat the ball, then he is out. So you have to make the decision. That's why umpires are paid the money they are, to make the decision on if he did or if he didn't. The only thing you can do is go by whether or not he beat the ball. If he did, then he is safe.

Here is another quote regarding the same question, in a Q and A with former major league umpire and current umpire academy owner Jim Evans. Evans' answer differs from McClelland's. Evans says the rulebook states, "...that a runner is out IF the defensive team tags him or his base BEFORE he reaches it. The implication is if the tag doesn't occur first (not at the same time or after), the runner would be safe." Here this umpire prefers rules 6.05 (j) and 7.08 (e) over McClelland's selection, so he calls the runner safe.

Proponents of the conflicting methods of interpretation shown above deal with two rules, 7.1 and 7.08 (e) in particular, that cannot both be true and cannot both be false. We are left with a logical contradiction. Unfortunately, we're also left no closer to a concrete solution.

In looking through baseball's rules, nothing says that a 'tie goes to the runner'. Feel free to ridicule any who claim that wording is in the book. However, calling such an idea a myth may be pushing it, since an umpire may call a runner safe on a tie.

Umpires will call a runner both safe and out on ties at different times. Some will do so for different reasons, either by 'missing' the call because they ruled that the ball or runner did get there first, or by choosing one particular rule over another from among the same set of rules. The umpire must make a judgment call on such plays, as he often does in the game of baseball. Even though there surely can be a tie at a base, a call either way must be made by men with differing opinions of what the correct call is.

That sounds a lot like the methodology in interpreting the strike zone.

---

From the Chicago Tribune:

As he saw it -- a conversation about life behind the umpire's mask


http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2009/03/as-he-saw-it-a-conversation-about-life-behind-the-umpires-mask.html

My college friend Bruce Weber, a reporter for the New York Times, is the author of "As They See `Em -- A Fan's Travels in the Land of Umpires" being published this month by Scribner. The following is a lightly edited transcript of our recent e-mail exchange:

EZ: So they're not necessarily the guys who started out at 14 umping T-ball games in the summer and kept it up every summer through high school and college. Hmm. Now, I'm assuming that after umpire school they all know the basics well enough -- tie does NOT go to the runner, I never knew that, though I would argue with great passion that it should -- so what is it that separates good umps from bad umps?

BW: If you're suggesting there is such a thing as an umpire nerd, yes, there is.

As for what distinguishes a good ump from a bad ump, I'd say it's akin to the difference between a good military officer and a not so good one. Some people have the ability to project confidence and authority and some don't; some people are able to give others confidence in their judgment and to reassure them that their livelihood is in good hands and some aren't.

By the way, you can argue all you want that a tie should go to the runner, but it's like arguing that a hitter should get four strikes.

Neither is the rule. Rule 7.01:"A runner acquires the right to an unoccupied base when he touches it before he is out." BEFORE he is out, not at the same time.

EZ: One last thing. The rulebook may say otherwise, but don't you, in your heart, say, as we have all said since childhood, that a tie should go to the runner? How can you possibly defend the sacrilegious idea that a tie goes to the defense?

BW: I'd rather say there's no such thing as a tie. Either the ball beats the runner to the base or the runner beats the ball.

---

What wins in the playoffs? BALANCE.....

As we prepare to enter baseball's second season, the baseball gurus and pundits will deliver their pet theories as to what "wins in the playoffs". Normally it boils down to a single facet of the game like "defense wins championships" or "pitching wins in the playoffs" or some other neat, simple theory as to what wins. And we will self-select examples of teams that fit the mold/theory we create. But is it really that simple? And if it was, wouldn't it be easy to win championships?

From personal observation over the years, I saw too many teams that were somewhat one-dimensional in one area--built around the "defense wins championships" mantra-- that did not win in the playoffs due to the lack of even a modicum of offense. My football Giants did manage to win a couple of Super Bowls around a rock-ribbed defense and a somewhat pedestrian offense. They were also defeated in a Super Bowl by a Ravens team that was superior defensively and the opposite offensively. But these examples seem to be more the exception rather than the rule. I also remember watching many Pat Riley led Knicks teams in basketball that were built around strong defense--so much so that they couldn't throw the ball in the ocean at times--losing to more well-balanced Bulls and Rockets teams.

So what works in baseball?

Does better pitching win in the playoffs? It depends on what metric you look at-- just looking at lower ERA for example--the results are mixed. About 60% of the teams with lower ERA's win in the divisional and league championship series (about 62.5% win) but lose in the World Series (about 62% lose). Yikes, that's not conclusive. A mixed bag at best.

How about better defense? If you use fielding percent as a measurement, look again. Only about 50/50 in the DS and LCS and the roughly the same for the World Series. Inconclusive results at best, a coin flip.

How about the team with the better record? Does dominance in the marathon of the regular season translate into the sprint that is the playoffs? Here the results are a little bit clearer. In the DS and LCS, teams with the better overall record wins about 60% of the time. In the World Series, it's a coin flip. And this makes some sense since, even in this era of inter-league play, there likely isn't enough of a sample of games played to use the overall record as a valid metric for comparison in the World Series.

So what seems to work?

Teams that win the regular season series (establish dominance) win when they meet again in the playoffs. At about a 60% clip. That's significant and it makes sense intuitively. Don't fight the trend.

It dovetails nicely into the next metric. Home field advantage. That still works too. At about a high 50% rate. Which makes sense, the team that has the better overall record earns home-field advantage, has established dominance over the other team during the season. Those built in advantages are hard to turn around in the playoffs.

Having the better closer seems to work. If regular season saves are the metric used, the team with the more dominant closer wins about 70% of the time in the league playoffs and about 57% of the time in the World Series. Which makes sense, the team is playing with the lead late in games and has a rally stopper at the end of the bullpen to shorten games.

So pitching plays more of a role than hitting in a teams ability to MAKE the playoffs. For the most part, spotty pitching probably eliminates teams more so than dominant pitching wins for them. And hitting probably plays a lesser role than any element of the game. If we look at what statistics lead to ADVANCING in the playoffs, we see very few hitting stats rise to the top.

In fact, the hitting metric that most tells what teams perform better in the playoffs is a low strikeout ratio. A lower K% translates to winning about 60% of the time and conversely the pitching staff that has a high K% (power pitching) wins 60% of the time.

For hitters, a higher OBA, higher batting average and a higher runs scored vs. runs allowed (really a team stat) translate to winning in the playoffs about 55% of the time.

More stolen bases (speed) wins about 55% of the time as well. So a team with a more diversified offense, that can manufacture runs when the power bats go silent and keep pressure on the defense, has a better chance of winning than a one-dimensional offense.

For pitchers, allowing fewer hits than your opponents wins about 65% of the time. Number of shutouts vs. your opponents shutouts (dominant pitching) wins about 67% of the time. Keeping the ball in the yard wins about 60% level as well and not allowing runs wins about 55% of the time (seems like a no brainer).

The better fielding team, measured by number of errors, wins about 60% of the time as well, so defense shows up as a statistically significant measurement as well.

So we have pitching, speed, defense...what about hitting? Don't chicks dig the long ball in the playoffs? Well, they may dig the long ball, but they will probably need a boost of Viagra if their favorite team relies on the long ball to win in the playoffs.

Teams that win the HR battle during the season only succeed at about a 40% rate in the playoffs. Slugging Percent--about 40% winning percentage. Batting Average and OBA are about a coin flip. 50/50.

So what's a team to do, what is the formula for success in the playoffs?

Formula for pitchers:
Allow fewer hits than your opponent - Wins 70% of the time.
Have your pitchers throw MORE shutouts - Wins 70% of the time.
Have your pitcher keep the ball in the yard - Wins 65% of the time.
Pitch more complete games - Wins 60% of the time.
Have a lower ERA that your opponents - Wins 60% of the time.

Formula for fielders/defense:
Commit fewer errors than your opponent - Wins 70% of the time.
Have a higher Defensive Efficiency Rating than your opponent - Wins 60% of the time.

Formula for base runners:
Steal more bases than your opponent - Wins 65% of the time.

Formulas for hitters:
Strikeout fewer times than your opponent - Wins 70% of the time.

So, pitch, play defense, put pressure on the opponents defense, steal bases and hitters--just don't strike out, put ball in play and extend AB's.

The conclusion seems to be that winning in the playoffs doesn't lend itself neatly to reliance on one dimension or one individual metric, but rather on a well-balanced composite of skills that lead to success.

THAT WAS EASY!!!

DAVID ORTIZ AND THE "ABILITY TO DRAW WALKS"

Not surprisingly, ESPN's Steve Phillips made a shockingly bad "defense" of David Ortiz and his legacy in the aftermath of the revelation that Ortiz was a positive test in 2003. Phillips made the case that he "observed" Ortiz' development from his days with the Twins into a player who "learned" how to take walks and become a more patient hitter and that this, more than anything else, was responsible for the staggering numbers he produced with the Red Sox.


From ESPN's You Tube Site: Phillips comments are at about the 1:45 mark

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qqfPkw4uzLU

I could just imagine Joe Morgan throwing something at his TV screen as well, because this is one of the themes that emanated from the "Moneyball" revolution that is wholly erroneous on a macro basis and certainly weak/non-existent in the individual example of David Ortiz.

Many who read "Moneyball" came away with the impression that the A's used statistical analysis to identify high-OPS, high-walk ratio hitters in the college ranks, who had a greater probability for success at the major league level. This was an extension of the strategy employed at the major league level, which was to identify these type of players and acquire those who were not valued as highly as their peers--who were using other metrics to acquire/reward hitters.

The A's were able to acquire productive players economically and compete for a time at the major league level. I still maintain that this ability to compete only lasted as long as the starting staff included Zito, Hudson and Mulder but that's another story.

Anyway, the A's model at the player developmental level was highlighted by their drafting of a catcher by the name of Jeremy Brown, who they identified as being one of these high-OPS, high walk ratio guys. He was drafted by the A's higher than virtually anyone would have projected--meaning they overpaid for him--which seemingly defeated the purpose of acquiring talent economically, but I digress.

Many of the other guys they identified while the author followed the process--guys like Nick Swisher and Khalil Greene--subsequently developed into good major league hitters. But most if not all of these players did not follow the model that the A's suggested they would to succeed.

In the same way, David Ortiz did not follow the "model" as Steve Phillips believes he did.

The model suggest that there is some inherent ability to work the count, exhibit patience as a hitter and draw walks, thus becoming a high-OPS, productive hitter that contributes to more team wins. The productivity flows from this perceived ability that can be somehow identified statistically.

What the model ignores is the human elements that cannot be quantified until after the fact, if at all.

The high-OPS, high walk rate flows from the hitter earning RESPECT from the pitcher. Once the pitcher believes that he can be hurt by throwing pitches in certain zones-- which tightens the window that pitchers can throw to--thereby increasing the hitters walk rate. That does not happen until the hitter "hurts" the pitcher and earns respect.

To extrapolate to the extreme, if you had a hitter with fighter pilots 20/10 vision, who could identify balls/strikes with a 99% success ratio compared to Questec--but couldn't hit a lick--how many walks would that hitter draw at any level above Little League? Probably not many.

As hitters advance from one level to the next, whether it's from HS to college, college to low minors, minors to majors--that RESPECT must be earned again.

That is why you will see virtually all of the A's players identified in college as the prototype, model high-OPS, high walk-rate player not statistically demonstrate that "ability" as they enter the minor league system. Why? They have to earn RESPECT of the pitchers all over again. Pitchers who didn't read the hitters stat sheets or press clippings and are trying to earn their own measure of RESPECT.

Respect is earned, and as the Dominicans say, "You can't walk off the island". Respect is earned with the bat. Ted Williams earned his reputation with the bat first and then the high walk rate followed. Respect was earned from pitchers and umpires and the walks followed.

Look at Ortiz ' career stats from Baseball Reference:

DAVID ORTIZ CAREER STATS FROM BASEBALL REFERENCE.COM
http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/o/ortizda01.shtml

You can clearly see he debuts with the Twins in 1997 as an above average hitter as measured by an OPS of .802 and an OPS+ of 107 (OPS+ of 100 is major league average, it is OPS--On Base Average + Slugging--compared to the league average). His Walk Rate (Walks divided by Plate Appearances) of 4%. FOUR PERCENT!! OK only 51 AB's, but it demonstrates what players do when they advance levels. They try to show their talent.

In 1998, his Walk Rate stabilizes at 12%, which becomes his baseline for the next couple of years. His OPS is .817 and OPS+ is 111.

1999 is a lost year, only 25 Plate Appearances, statistically meaningless.

2000, Walk Rate - 12%. OPS - .810, OPS+ - 101
2001, Walk Rate - 12%, OPS - .799, OPS+ - 106
2002, Walk Rate - 9%, OPS - .839, OPS+ 120

A Bit of a breakout as a hitter, higher OPS with a LOWER walk rate. Hardly the skill or ability that Phillips is articulating. Then the trade to the Red Sox.

2003 OPS rises to .961, OPS+ rises to 144 and yet walk rate only comes back to the original baseline of 12%. Again, hardly what Phillips was articulating. More like Ortiz is finding his wheels as a power hitter, a force--but pitchers still are not convinced.

In 2004 again OPS rises to .983, OPS+ rises to 145 and yet WALK RATE declines to 11%. The OPPOSITE of what Phillips says he observed.

Finally in 2005, OPS cracks 1.001, OPS + rises again to 158 and now pitchers appear to be convinced, elevating Ortiz' walk rate to 14.5%.

Ortiz punished pitchers for 2-3 years before THEY ADJUSTED, by giving Ortiz the RESPECT as a hitter that he EARNED. We're not seeing some inherent ability to draw walks that flows into increased production. We're seeing quite the opposite.

More interesting is the recent history.

In 2006 OPS - 1.049, OPS+ - 161, Walk Rate - 16%
In 2007 OPS - 1.066, OPS+ - 171, Walk Rate - 16%

In 2008 OPS falls to .877, OPS+ to 123 and walk rate follows to 14%.
In 2009 OPS plummets to .720, OPS+ to 82 and walk rate drops to 11%.

What happened? The "ability" to draw walks should be getting better with age, but we see that RESPECT is lost. Scouts whisper, "Ortiz lost bat speed, can't turn on the good FB anymore" and more than whisper, they write this in their advance reports which are read by pitchers and catchers. And the rest is history.

It doesn't even matter WHY Ortiz lost bat speed. Take the PED speculation out of your mind for a moment and it's crystal clear what happens at the cellular level in MLB. And it's been happening like this for generations and will continue to do so. The other issues just muddy the waters a little bit.

We see the same thing with uber-prospects like Colby Rasmus. When they debut in the majors, they have all this advance billing baggage and mega-bonus money to validate.
And that is what they try to do. And pitchers initially exploit that, yes. But the bottom line is this: If this is even a chicken/egg debate, it seems pretty clear which comes first.

The debate remains if plate discipline is a teachable, identifiable skill or an inherent, God-given skill. The old nature vs. nurture argument. Good luck winning one of those.

Are some hitters so "hard-wired" in their approach since their youth days to be either a "hacker" or a "selective" hitter that they cannot be changed after HS-collegiate level?

Does the pressure to perform either to justify money/publicity received or potentially obtained in the future create such "internal noise" that players cannot be changed significantly?

Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between the extremes and includes some measure of all the extrinsic variables. Maybe there are just too many human variables to quantify as efficiently as we would like. Put that in your spreadsheet and smoke it.

THE DEATH OF MONEYBALL?

The recent trade of Nick Swisher from the A's to the Chicago White Sox caused me to revisit the concepts and premises put forth in the book Moneyball by Michael Lewis.

Swisher along with fellow 1st round draft pick Jeremy Brown were a couple of the examples put forth by the author to document the superiority of the A's approach of identifying undervalued, college hitters based on statistical analysis.

As much as I admire the approach, and believe that it is a more efficient approach to drafting hitters, I did not think at the time that it was the proximate cause of the A's success. I believed then that the emergence of the "Big Three" Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder and Barry Zito in fact were. Hindsight, I believe has proven that to be true.

An examination of the A's record:

Three years prior to Hudson-Mulder-Zito:

1996 78-84 .481
1997 65-97 .401
1998 74-88 .457

Basically, a 70-92 team, or the Devil Rays wildest dream year.

During the Big Three years

Year Record Pct Big Three Record Big 3 w/o Big Three Adj Wins Diff
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1999 87-75 .537 Huds 11-2 11-2 76-73 .510 83 Wins +4
2000 91-70 .565 Huds 20-6 Muld 9-10 Zito 7-4 36-20 55-50 .524 85 Wins +6
2001 102-60 .630 Huds 18-9 Muld 21-8 Zito 17-8 56-25 46-35 .568 91 Wins +11
2002 103-59 .636 Huds 15-9 Muld 19-7 Zito 23-5 57-21 46-38 .549 89 Wins +14
2003 96-66 .593 Huds 16-7 Muld 15-9 Zito 14-12 45-28 51-38 .573 93 Wins +3
2004 91-71 .562 Huds 12-6 Muld 17-8 Zito 11-11 40-25 51-46 .526 85 Wins +6

Notes on methodology
(Huds=Tim Hudson Muld=Mark Mulder Zito=Barry Zito)
If you compile the Big Three Record and show the teams record without them you get the adjusted record/winning percentage. If you were to replace them with an average starter (.500 record) you get the adjusted record without the big three and the difference they made in the teams success.

After the Big Three Years
2005 88-74 .543 Zito 14-13
2006 93-69 .574 Zito 16-10
2007 78-86 .469

Clearly the results show the team was built primarily on the success and development of the Big Three, but even more importantly, it shows that Beane and the A's failed to capitalize on the opportunity to rebuild the farm system using the Moneyball premises for the inevitable time when the franchise knew they would lose each of the Big Three piece by piece. They clearly had a six year time frame to rebuild and have failed to do so.

At the time the book was written I tracked the draftees identified and found that they did not appear to follow the premises the statistical analysis indicated the A's were looking for. Players who were dominant hitters in college and therefore developed high OPS (On Base Percentage + Slugging) develop those statistics due to the fact that they are great hitters, feared by the opponent and are pitched around, rather than possessors of a great eye and plate discipline. The stats that are believed to track these abilities melt like a glacier in Florida as hitters face higher levels of pitching. Granted, as they learn and develop and master the pitching, the statistics follow.

That is one of the fallacies I think the book propagated was that there was this innate ability that could be tracked and identified by these new statistical methods over the traditional scouting methods. I think this has been finally proven to be false. The A's did nothing more extraordinary or different than what the Twins have done in recent years, that is capitalize on some young, dominant pitcher rising to the major league level at approximately the same time, resulting in success over and above what the teams payroll would suggest.

I believe Michael Lewis wrote in the past that much of Warren Buffet's success could be attributable to luck or something to be expected within the basic laws of probability rather than an level of innate genius. If that is the case, along with the thoughts and premises expounded in the book Moneyball, in my mind that makes the count 0-2 on Mr. Lewis.

Below is an article I wrote after first reading of the book:
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Money Ball: Myths & Realities
By Charles Slavik, NSCA-CPT*D
President of Eagle Baseball Club


First let me start off by saying the book is a great baseball book. Not quite to the level of “Men at Work” by George Will or “The Game According to Syd” or even the recently released “Numbers Game” by Alan Schwarz as far as useful information regarding the game to the reader, but for the most part, a great read.


The inside information an “fly on the wall” perspective provided an interesting perspective of the issues big league teams face on a daily basis. Moneyball highlights a still somewhat controversial use of statistical evaluation applied to scouting, evaluating and procuring talent at the minor league and major league levels.

Although, as the book mentions (but “Numbers Game” does better), there is a rich history of the use of statistical data in baseball to improve team quality and fan understanding of the game, recently franchises have been almost handing the keys to the franchise over to stat gurus at the expense of traditional “baseball men” whether they be scouts, coaches, ex-players, etc.


Statistical analysis, when properly used, is usually better than the accuracy of subjective “gut feeling” methods of used by traditionalists. Emotional bias is removed from the equation. At least that is the hope and expectation. Moneyball details the way the cost-conscious Oakland A's General Manager Billy Beane built a perennial playoff team by focusing on underappreciated player statistics, such as on-base percentage and the number of walks a player takes, qualities that most general managers tend to devalue.

My problems with the book are that some of the central premises that build the story are specious:

• Whether or not the A’s revolutionary approach is primarily responsible for their success as opposed to other factors (like lucking into the troika of Zito, Hudson, Mulder a big three starting rotation that is the envy of baseball) is ignored, glossed over or batted away in argument. I mean they hit three for three on college pitchers in short order. Subtract one of those guys or replace one or two of them with average starters, as I know SABR-cats have a ready made formula for figuring out and the A’s may be a .500 team. Ballpark though for each one of those guys that goes from producing 70% victories in each start to about 50% provided by an average starter and with 30 starts each, I don’t even need my pocket calculator to tell each stud is worth 5-7 extra wins per season. Enough to catapult a .500 team into a 95-100 win team each season they remain healthy and productive.


• The method of evaluating talent at the collegiate and major league level is primarily dependent on the use of statistical analysis to find players who are “undervalued and under appreciated” by the marketplace for their contribution to building a winning team. Due to the weakness of the systems ability to quantify and evaluate skills such as speed, fielding ability these traits in players are largely ignored. High School hitters are virtually ignored as a class due to the unreliability of the statistical data needed to evaluate them. This would leave Eric Chavez, currently the A’s most successful hitter and a High School draftee from the Sandy Alderson regime the preceded Beane’s, persona non grata under the new system.


• As we’ve seen by the recent retooling of the Red Sox, who under Theo Epstein, is also an advocate of the statistical analysis approach, albeit combined with a hefty checkbook. Hey, you need every weapon in the arsenal when you have to fight THE EVIL EMPIRE (Yankees) on a daily basis. The Sox recognized the importance of fielding as a necessary component of a winning team and went out and got two gloves to firm up the defense. The ripple effect will strengthen an already strong pitching staff.


• The premise and approach may work during the course of a long regular season where small, marginal advantages like focusing on artificially increasing team On Base Averages will produce marginal increases in Total Wins. The season is a marathon not a sprint. However, the playoffs are a sprint. And here the A’s and the approach have to answer to its historical futility. Opposing pitchers focus and control are sharper, more defined. What was the enduring image of the 2003 Playoffs for A’s fans? Not so much Derek Lowe’s fist pumping, jock thumping histrionics towards the A’s bench, although that by itself would be enough. Come on guys focus here. It was Terrance Long striking out looking at the last two strikes (that’s a backwards K if you’re scoring at home). Executing the A’s imposed philosophy to the bitter end. This from a middle of the order type guy, in a clutch, game winning situation. I’m sorry, SABR-cats also don’t believe in the ability of clutch hitting either since it can’t be proven statistically. Talk about your self-fulfilling prophecy, who’s writing these endings, Hollywood?


• An apparent disdain for those skills whose impact cannot be accurately measured using statistics or which the A’s feel are overvalued by the market, such as speed and fielding, are ignored by the team. I believe this is done at their peril and ignores these skills ripple effect on the measurable stats of other players. So if you don’t have speedy, good fielding players you hurt your pitching staff and your other hitter who don’t benefit from the effect of the threat of the stolen base on opposing pitchers minds, catchers framing pitchers and infielders positioning to defense the steal giving succeeding hitters more holes to hit through. Look at the effect Dave Roberts being on base against Mariano Rivera and other Yankee pitchers. The mere threat of the stolen base rattled him right off the mound into an eventual blown save. And a sacrifice bunt the very next inning by the Red Sox to manufacture the go ahead run was pure anti-Money Ball behavior.


Anyway, back to our story. To be honest, I was almost lost at the beginning of the book by author Michael Lewis. The first line of the preface was “I wrote this book because I fell in love with a story”. It just conjured up images of the book “Love Story”. I’m not sure if we should begin to worry about Al Gore saying he was the original model for the Billy Beane character and that he actually invented SABR but I read on despite my fears.

The central premise of the book is that from the front office level to the clubhouse and onto the field, the A’s were unfit, undervalued, underdog players competing against the Yankees of the world. Isn’t that precious? They’re so cute at that age and everyone loves an underdog, so you have me back now. How did one of the poorest teams in baseball win so many games? Of course the Twins have done similar things recently with a more traditional approach and the Marlins have won two World Championships with two distinct approaches and yet have flown under the radar as far as Michael Lewis is concerned. Are they also doing something different that needs to looked at or glorified.

Quote from the book - “Geek numbers show, no prove, that the traditional yardsticks of success for players and teams are fatally flawed”. That’s strong stuff. I’m always a little suspicious when someone uses this type of hyperbole. So everyone’s been wrong all these years and the boy-wonder genius is going to show them the error of their ways, is that it. No wonder the establishment hates him; I’m starting to get a little uncomfortable myself. Look, nobody is reinventing the wheel here; the wheel was a pretty darn good invention. Oh there may be some marginal improvements here and there in design and performance enhancements of the wheel by tire companies, but nobody is reinventing the wheel.

After reading the book, I’m not sure that even the title “Money Ball” is accurate. Money Ball is what the Yankees, Red Sox and now the Angels are playing. The A’s approach is more like “Flea Market Ball”. Not sexy enough I guess and you need a sexy title to sell books and befit the “sexiest General Manager in the Big Leagues”. I actually felt dirty enough when I read that quote to take an immediate shower. That was the kind of inside information about the A’s and Billy Beane I didn’t need. And the fact that he referred to himself by that title in playful banter with another GM’s secretary, Yuck.

For review I’ll summarize some of the key features of the A’s approach and compare and contrast it to another low-budget team, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays:

A’s Red Sox
GM: Billy Beane / Theo Esptein
Budget: Low-Budget
Draft Approach: Older, Collegiate Performance, Stat Based SABR approach (WYSIWYG), Non-Athletic
Players: Non-Athletic, Plow Horse type players (we’re not selling jeans here) Jeremy Brown, Nick Swisher, Khalil Greene, et al

Devil Rays
GM: Chuck Lamar
Budget: Low
Draft Approach: Young High Ceiling, Projectable Athletic, Combine type players
Players: Carl Crawford, Rocco Baldelli, BJ Upton, Delmon Young

Both systems can and do work to develop low budget teams into competitive teams. So to does International scouting and development of players in places like the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.

Anyway back to our hero, Billy Beane:

There are several "holes" in the book that could be seen as Lewis embellished some things in order to make the story read better. Hey, love is blind, right. Also, there are aspects of the book that are open to debate, whether those are related specifically to Billy Beane, more generally about the A's organization as a whole, or simply about the way things and people are portrayed in the book.


For balance, here are the positives from of the book were as follows:

• It’s a great story with great characters, the under appreciated hitter, Scott Hattieberg, the draftee Jeremy Brown and the chapter about pitcher Chad Bradford should almost become required reading for pitching coaches and scouts who think you need to have picture-perfect mechanics with a howitzer attached to your throwing arm.


• The success of the A's is an interesting story. Good vs. Evil, David vs. Goliath, Anybody vs. the Yankees makes for an interesting storyline. The reactions of traditionalists to the A’s methodology are an interesting story. And Michael Lewis can tell a good story. Moneyball is perfect for those of us who have ever dreamt of running a franchise, because of it’s of fly-on-the-wall moments. You are in the war room prior to and during the draft. How do they evaluate and decide on players and the teams overall draft strategy? What interaction do scouts, owners have on decision making? Who makes the final call? Trades and late-season roster moves, you are there hanging around A's front office, so to speak.


• The A’s Philosophy itself is a story. This is really the star of the book and has garnered the most attention from the media and baseball types, but it should’t be. Most people recognize the A's are a low-budget team that has a somewhat different organizational philosophy from other low-budget teams, of which there are many. Moneyball examines why they do all the things they do. The key is finding said valuable players on the cheap. The A's simply cannot afford to acquire players that have all the skills a baseball player can have. They have discovered that there are some skills that are at the same time disproportionately valuable and disproportionately cheap. Plate discipline is one of the skills that are undervalued.

• Speed costs money. Defense costs money. Power costs money. Batting average costs money. Athleticism costs money. The one thing that the A's believe doesn't cost as much as all the other things is a player with the ability to see lots of pitches, work lots of counts, draw lots of walks and get on-base. The A's succeed because they are able to identify players that other teams do not value highly, simply because of what those players cannot do and the A's recognize that there is value in what they can do.

• Jeremy Brown, an overweight college catcher, whom the A's drafted in the first round of the 2001 draft, as everyone laughed at them. Baseball America, one of the most respected baseball publications out there, one of the leading "draft experts" and one of the only magazines that I subscribe to, did not have Jeremy Brown ranked among the top 25 catching prospects in the 2002 draft. Not the top 25 overall prospects, the top 25 catching prospects. BA also did not list Jeremy Brown among their "Top 250 Prospects" in the 2002 draft. 250! Heck, BA had Brown ranked as the 12th best player from the state of Alabama. And yet, Billy Beane and the Oakland A's selected Jeremy Brown, the fat catcher from the U of Alabama that no one was even paying attention to and that most people probably didn't even have on their draft list, with the 35th pick in the entire draft. They then signed Brown for $350,000. The guy picked directly in front of him signed for $1,000,000 and the guy picked directly behind him signed for $1,050,000.

Many other teams employ this type of pre-draft agreement to get players on the cheap. I’m still not sold on the fact that they didn’t overpay for Jeremy Brown anyway. They could have drafted him in the tenth round and signed him for less than $100,000 guaranteed. How is that not a waste of $250,000? "Brown's short, squat body turned off many scouts and doesn't fit the mold of the more athletic modern big league catcher. But the A's general manager Billy Beane said, 'We're not selling jeans here.' If [Brown] continues to perform well, he'll be on the fast track to the majors." In the span of less than a year, Brown went from a guy they didn't think deserved to be picked in the first 10 rounds of a draft, to a guy "on the fast track to the majors." And that's no knock against Baseball America, it just tells you a little bit about Billy Beane and the A's. Again here in most organizations, where you’re drafted determines and the signing bonus delivered determines whether player is on the fast-track or slow track to through the system, many times at the expense of performance. Oakland says they can't afford to go after the 5-tool hitters with blazing speed and the ability to fill out a uniform in a way that scouts like. Instead, they go after guys that have been overlooked because of their body or their foot speed or their lack whatever it is that most scouts are looking for.

• The A’s can't afford to take a risk on an 18 year old high school pitcher that is 6 foot 5 and throws 99 miles per hour. Instead, they take a smallish RHP from Auburn (Hudson) and a LHP from USC (Zito), that some scouts project as a #4 or #5 starter, because he doesn't throw hard, and make him the 9th overall pick in the 1999 draft. Then they add another collegiate LHP from Michigan State (Mulder) and all three picks hit big. Now if you can find the story behind how they did that you could right a book that will break the bank in terms of sales.

In a few years, I wonder what the A's will be like without Zito (that lefty from Southern Cal) and Mulder and Hudson (the short righty from Auburn). Some say it won't matter, as long as Billy Beane is running things. I’m not sure they will be able to replace those players cheaply and efficiently.

There's a clear prejudice against many players Beane likes (ie: players who are fat or slow or who can't throw very hard). But books like "Moneyball" should convince enough teams to re-examine and abandon those prejudices, especially when they understand just how much money they can save doing so.

I don’t have a problem with this in theory. I just don’t see that many examples of slow, fat players who can perform in a sport that athletically is a ballistic, fast-speed sport. Heck, you can train a monkey to stand up there with a bat and take pitches, he’ll never hit well enough to progress. It’s one of those wonderful baseball paradoxes, a hitter has to be patiently-aggressive, a pitcher has to have speed and control even though there is inherently a trade-off between these qualities. I don’t believe the A’s approach has solved for this dilemma.

Then, you have to eventually worry about copy-cats within the industry cannibalizing the available number of players who suit their criteria. As other teams take players the A’s like off the unemployment line the value of those players eventually go up. The A’s will eventually have to push some chips to the center of the table. They may believe that for the guys who don’t understand or believe, no to fad-like change will make a difference, at least not for a generation or so. Then, folks will be off in search of the next “big thing”

The last major fundamental change in player procurement began in the late 1940s, when the Dodgers became the first team to sign black players. Most other teams overcame that entrenched prejudice within a decade. Latin American players were next as the cost to sign and develop players are still cheaper than in the good old USA. Currently a higher proportion of players are coming from Latin American countries than ever before.

In both examples however, ultimately the player has to perform well on the field for the success of the “system” to be hailed. If the players stats indicate that he will perform well at the next level, so be it, you draft him. But to draft players simply because they are less expensive than others and have gaudy stats that may not be reliable, well sometimes you get what you pay for.

The other weakness seems to be that the approach looks at stats that are generated which may beg the caveat “past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance”. At some point, skills diminish. One would think a case could be made that the next revolution in player development will be made in player evaluation metrics that are reliable predictors of future performance, as the NFL does in the draft combine. In that case you would evaluate and draft those players that meet these metrics, draft them and rely on your coaching staffs to develop them, as the NFL does.