The List: Eight Prospects With Strike Zone Red Flags - BaseballAmerica.com

As the article mentions, plate discpline stats are not the be-all or end-all when evaluating prospects development. But this article is from four years ago and only the top three of eight has made even a minimal impact at the major league level, and arguable only one has made a substantial impact. Why is this? It's likely because, as in the accuracy argument for QB's making the transition from NCAA to the NFL, if you can't do it at the lower level -- where pitchers are also struggling with command and control issues -- you won't be able to succeed giving away pitches and AB's at the major league level. They will exploit your weaknesses better than A level or even AA level ball. 

I agree with the title of this article, like with QB's it is a red-flag. 

from BaseballAmerica.com
http://www.baseballamerica.com/minors/8-hitting-prospects-with-strike-zone-red-flags/?_wcsid=8EB162800D50BAD2AB74003610640D767EBA8CD553241916#HbgdBAvqOIhUkXqe.97

THE LIST: EIGHT PROSPECTS WITH STRIKE ZONE RED FLAGS

It's still early in the minor league season, but we're at the point where we have meaningful data on players, both in terms of their performance and traditional scouting methods.

For hitters, the ability to control the strike zone is crucial. Whether it's plate discipline, pitch recognition or just swinging and missing through too many pitches in the strike zone, many promising prospects with tremendous raw tools have never been able to make the next step because of their inability to hone the strike zone.

That doesn't mean every minor league hitter with a low walk rate or a high strikeout rate is a bust waiting to happen. Pirates outfielder Starling Marte is an example of a player who never walked much in the minors but has become one of the best players in the game. And we have seen plenty of minor league hitters whose best skill was their ability to draw a walk never have success beyond the minors.

So while plate discipline is not necessarily a make-or-break factor in predicting a prospect's future, it's a red flag when hitters are having trouble recognizing spin, fishing for too many pitches outside the strike zone or are getting beat in the zone with stuff exposing holes in their swing. Hitters can certainly develop and cut down on those holes, but the pitching they're going to face only gets better as they move through the minors.

The hitters listed below are all examples of talented prospects who have red flags in their game related to their ability to control the strike zone. Some of these players are struggling, while others are off to seemingly great starts but have underlying issues that are cause for concern going forward.

1. Tim Anderson, ss, White Sox

Plate discipline has long been a concern with Anderson, but even with his aggressive approach he shined last year upon his jump to Double-A Birmingham. This year in Triple-A Charlotte, one of the most favorable parks in the minors for hitters, Anderson is hitting .287/.310/.380. Anderson is a premium athlete with plus-plus wheels and quick bat speed, but with five walks and 38 strikeouts in 155 plate appearances, his free-swinging tendencies hamper his ability to get on base.

2. Daz Cameron, of, Astros

Cameron signed for $4 million as the No. 37 overall pick in last year's draft, but the early returns have been ugly, to the point where the Astros sent him back to extended spring training after May 1. Cameron has swung and missed liberally, with 33 strikeouts in 87 plate appearances (38 percent), eight walks and a .143/.221/.221 overall line for low Class A Quad Cities. The good news is Cameron has still looked excellent defensively, with multiple diving catches. And if Cameron needs inspiration for how to turn things around after struggling in the Midwest League, he can just ask his father, Mike, who batted .238/.292/.297 in 122 games for South Bend as a 20-year-old, then eventually became one of the game's premier center fielders.

3. Austin Riley, 3b, Braves

Riley got off to a torrid start in his pro debut last season, batting .304/.389/.544 with 12 home runs in 60 games between two levels of Rookie ball. Riley has big-time raw power, but low Class A pitching has exposed more holes in Riley's swing, with nine walks and 44 strikeouts in 137 plate appearances for a .248/.299/.400 line overall.

4. Jake Gatewood, 3b, Brewers

Size can be a double-edged sword for hitters. In general, the bigger hitter will usually have more power potential than the shrimp, but at a certain point, being too tall works against a hitter. Being taller means the hitter has a larger strike zone he has to cover, and with longer arms often comes a longer swing with more holes. Gatewood has serious raw power, but he's hitting just .267/.277/.444 in 137 plate appearances. His free-swinging, all-or-nothing approach holds him back, with only one walk and 41 strikeouts for low Class A Wisconsin.

5. Monte Harrison, of, Brewers

When the Brewers drafted Harrison out of high school in the second round of the 2014 draft, he looked like a player who could combine top-shelf athleticism with a patient hitting approach to develop into a dynamic prospect. Instead, Harrison has been held bag by injuries and excessive strikeouts. Harrison's bat speed, foot speed and arm strength are still impressive raw tools, but he has hit just .160/.243/.210 with nine walks and 39 strikeouts in 112 plate appearances in the low Class A Midwest League.

6. Eric Jenkins, of, Rangers

The Rangers rolling the dice on a raw, toolsy, high-upside high school player with one of their top picks? That sounds familiar. Nick Williams, Joey Gallo and Lewis Brinson have all broken through as premium prospects, and while Jenkins doesn't have the raw power to match any of those three, he's a dynamic athlete with plus-plus speed. Rangers minor league hitting coaches have done a stellar job getting prospects to cut down on strikeouts, something Jenkins will have to do as he's hitting .206/.263/.298 in 158 plate appearances with 11 walks and 48 strikeouts for low Class A Hickory.

7. Javier Guerra, ss, Padres

Guerra doesn't have to be a prolific hitter to be a valuable player. He's a plus defender at shortstop, with smooth actions, a quick first step and a nose for the ball to go with a plus arm. As long as he can be serviceable at the plate, Guerra can be an everyday shortstop. To do that, Guerra will have to stop chasing so many pitches outside the strike zone. He's hitting .221/.280/.359 for high Class A Lake Elsinore, with 11 walks and 46 strikeouts in 144 plate appearances.

8. Travis Demeritte, 2b, Rangers

On the surface, Demeritte looks like he's in the midst of a breakout season, batting .278/.366/.677 with 12 home runs in 35 games for high Class A High Desert. Demeritte's quick hands and plus raw power are legitimate, and he has taken a step forward from where he was a year ago. Yet High Desert is still a launching pad, and once he leaves there, the underlying swing-and-miss issues and chase tendencies will get magnified. His 18 walks in 153 plate appearances aren't a problem, but the 53 strikeouts (a 35 percent K-rate) are a concern.

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The Anatomy of GREAT AB aka: Buster Posey Fights for His Pitch | FanGraphs Baseball

Lost in the minutiae, just like the Giants greatness at times. The casual fan turns off or clicks to another channel after about 2 or 3 foul balls and misses the greatness that was embedded, but well hidden, in this AB. Like a pearl in a shell.

This AB is a mini-clinic on having a good hitting approach and strategy, plate discipline and batting eye as well as tough as nails two-strike hitting

from FanGraphs Baseball:
Buster Posey Fights for His Pitch | FanGraphs Baseball:

When a hitter gets into a two-strike count, his mission is to protect the plate. The expectation is that he’ll swing at anything close, so that he doesn’t strike out looking. You look stupid when you strike out looking and nobody likes it. This outside fastball was very close and Posey didn’t swing at it. It was a ball, it was definitely a ball, but it was almost a borderline strike, and there have been worse strikes before, probably even called by this very umpire. Posey didn’t swing at it. Had this pitch been called a strike, some fans might’ve been upset at Posey for not protecting. This pitch was called a ball and we wonder instead if Posey has just the most amazing eye in the universe. Results-based analysis allows us to label this a spectacular take. Blanton executed perfectly. Posey did the right thing, probably. Posey definitely did the right thing in hindsight.

'via Blog this'

The author ends his piece with "Great at bat by Posey. He seems to have a lot of those." Now you know why. Sometimes greatness in baseball is disguised or hidden beneath the surface and what seems to be inaction to the casual observer is really greatness in disguise. I think Paink and Belt show similar approaches and discipline and consequently they throw out great AB's on many occasions as well as Posey. Matt Carpenter of the Cardinals is another one from the opposite side of the field. They don't back down or give in with two strikes and they certainly don't just swing from the heels. They hunker down and battle.

If you have a lineup full of these type of guys you can grind down and wear out even the best pitchers. It seems like the Yankees and Mariners in the early 2000's were loaded with guys like this and go figure, both teams won a lot of games.


More from the article:

Okay, it’s 1-and-2. Blanton has thrown a first-pitch curve for a strike, a low changeup for a ball, and a slider for a strike. Already he’s given Posey a different look.

It’s hard to tell from the camera angle, but this is a fastball down and in, tucked just inside the corner of the zone. It looks like the pitch was supposed to be just a little more inside, to tie Posey up, but it wasn’t in a bad spot, and a foul was about the best Posey could’ve hoped for in a defensive situation. Posey couldn’t cheat by sitting on a fastball while behind in the count.

The thing about most curveballs is that they aren’t really swing-and-miss pitches, like you’d think they might be. They disrupt timing and frequently catch hitters looking. From his body language, Blanton probably hoped this was a swing-and-miss curveball. It was perfectly located, low, and just off the plate. Posey wound up ahead of it and barely got a piece. A piece was all that he needed to get to keep himself alive.

This is a pitch that was quickly forgotten, given the way the at-bat wound up. Ahead 1-and-2, Blanton missed with a fastball and gave Posey a heater right down the middle of the zone. This was presumably not one of the put-away pitches to which Blanton was referring. This was a mistake, but because Posey probably still had offspeed pitches in his mind, he couldn’t get the swing he’d like to get on this pitch. He stayed alive, though.

When a hitter gets into a two-strike count, his mission is to protect the plate. The expectation is that he’ll swing at anything close, so that he doesn’t strike out looking. You look stupid when you strike out looking and nobody likes it. This outside fastball was very close and Posey didn’t swing at it. It was a ball, it was definitely a ball, but it was almost a borderline strike, and there have been worse strikes before, probably even called by this very umpire. Posey didn’t swing at it. Had this pitch been called a strike, some fans might’ve been upset at Posey for not protecting. This pitch was called a ball and we wonder instead if Posey has just the most amazing eye in the universe. Results-based analysis allows us to label this a spectacular take. Blanton executed perfectly. Posey did the right thing, probably. Posey definitely did the right thing in hindsight.

Back to work. Blanton throws Posey a fastball tucked into the low-away corner. Maybe a little too over the plate, but not that badly over the plate. Posey knows to protect this time, because the pitch looks like a strike, or it looks like it could be called a strike. Foul ball. Tough pitch to hit; maybe the next one will be better. That’s the idea of the whole at-bat, basically. Tough pitch to hit; maybe the next one will be better.

I still can’t quite figure out how the at-bat didn’t end with a strikeout right here. This is a changeup, low, out of the zone, just over the outer half. It begins away and tails back over the plate, like a backdoor changeup, and also there’s the part where it was low and out of the zone. This is a strikeout pitch. I suppose it could’ve been more low, but it was sufficiently low to generate a swing and miss. Posey gets out in front and gets a piece. Tough pitch to hit; maybe the next one will be better.

Kablammo! “M-V-P” chants. “Beat L-A” chants. Starting to think that Blanton doesn’t only do the little hop when he thinks he’s getting a swing and miss. This is the very definition of a hanging slider. Instead of being thrown to a good spot, this slider is thrown to pretty much the worst possible spot, up and over the middle of the plate. I wouldn’t say it looks like a homer off the bat, but it looks like it might be a homer, and indeed it was a homer. Posey was working toward this, and after fighting off a bunch of pitcher’s pitches, he took advantage of a hitter’s pitch.

To review:

Old-timey baseball wisdom asserts that a hitter gets one pitch to hit in any given at-bat. Of course that isn’t always true, and it would be outrageously bizarre if that were always true, and here you could say that Posey got two good pitches to hit, even after falling into a two-strike count. The second pitch to hit was much much more hittable than the first one and Posey made no mistake. It was Blanton who made the mistake, after having executed so effectively before.

The temptation is to believe that Posey did this on purpose. That he kept fighting pitches off so he could live to see another. I’m guessing Posey wasn’t trying to just foul off all those pitches, but it’s to his credit that he could anyway. For the most part Blanton did what he wanted and he couldn’t make Posey go away until Posey made himself go away after jogging in a circle. Buster Posey kept himself from striking out when he easily could’ve struck out, and eventually, a pitcher will make a bad mistake. No pitcher can hit his spot every single time. Sometimes even the best command pitchers will miss by a foot, or more.

And that’s the story of how Buster Posey hit his 20th home run of the season. Draw all the parallels to the NL West race that you like. The Dodgers got off to a quick start, but they couldn’t put the Giants away, and the Giants ultimately vaulted ahead. I’ve said before that everything is something else in a nutshell, and this Blanton vs. Posey at-bat is most certainly included in everything.

Great at-bat by Posey. He seems to have a lot of those.

1. • • 
       

       
       
       

Launch Angle vs. Exit Angle | Inside Pitch Magazine

The Precise Point Hitting Mat is a tool hitters can use to practice optimal exit angle based on pitch location.

I get that everyone is blinded by recency bias, I still trust Ted Williams and Mike Epstein for that matter, for being pioneers in the "launch angle" revolution. 

from insidepitchonline.com

https://insidepitchonline.com/exitangle/

Launch Angle vs. Exit Angle

by Rob Ledington, Head Baseball Coach, Lynn Camp (KY) HSOver the past few years, there's been a great deal of discussion regarding the value of launch angles and offensive production, particularly as it relates to home runs, extra base hits, and runs batted in. The increased attention most likely contributed to the single-season home run record set by Major League Baseball this past season. However, does this information alone suggest that every hitter should increase their launch angle? The obvious answer is no.

A physical player with power and below average speed would obviously benefit from hitting home runs or balls in the gap for increased offensive productivity. These types of players are those who can most benefit from working on developing a higher launch angle. On the other hand, a smaller player with little power and superior speed would benefit from a lower launch angle, with their goal focused on producing line drives and hard ground balls. Even a 'swinging bunt' from smaller 'speed' guys is much more beneficial than most anything hit in the air. A buy-in to this approach can greatly increase offensive productivity by providing more opportunities to get on base, utilize their speed and ultimately, score more runs, which is what the offensive game of baseball is all about.
Exit angles, however, have equal value for all hitters regardless of size, speed, and/or desired launch angle. All hitters strive to hit the ball "squarely" thus maximizing exit velocity, and in some instances carry (travel in the air), while guarding against weakly hit fly balls and ground balls. What are exit angles? How do you determine the proper exit angle for each pitch location?

Exit angles are defined as the direction the ball goes after it is put in play. More simply put, the optimal exit angle is dependent on the lead foot, the bat and the ball creating a 90-degree angle at the point of contact. When this occurs, exit velocity is maximized for the ground ball, the line drive, and the fly ball because this contact will not create sidespin. Additionally, a fly ball will travel farther in the air when combined with the proper launch angle and backspin rotation. A high launch angle with a tardy swing (less than square) will create a high fade (in golf terms), or sidespin much like a sinker (in pitching terms), producing less exit velocity and carry. Conversely, an early swing at a high launch angle will create hook spin (in golf terms), or cutter/slider spin (in baseball terms) producing less exit velocity and carry. Therefore, only the ball struck at the optimal launch angle combined with the optimal exit angle will produce maximum exit velocity and distance in the air. It should be noted that is it entirely possible to hit a ball hard without "square contact."

It is common knowledge that a four-seam fastball (with backspin) has more velocity and carry than a sinker, a cutter, or a slider. Similarly, a drive down the middle of the fairway with backspin will travel farther in the air than a fade or a hook. Thus, to maximize exit velocity and distance in the air, the launch angle and the exit angle must work together, with the exit angle having greater importance of the two. This is especially for the smaller player, unless they enjoy jogging to second base and back to the dugout!

Since the invention of the game, baseball coaches have taught their players to hit the pitch thrown down the middle of the plate back through the middle of the diamond. Ironically when this happens "square contact" occurs as it relates to the lead foot, the bat, and the ball at the point of contact. Once this central contact point has been established, it becomes possible to determine every other point of square contact, both on the inside and outside parts of the plate. For example, if the pitch is outside, coaches will say things like, "let it get deeper" or "let it travel." When the pitch is inside, you are likely to hear "hit that out in front of the plate" or "get your foot down and swing earlier." These statements are painfully obvious to everyone, but without an understanding of specifically what needs to happen to yield optimal results, making these adjustments can be a challenge.

The general rule when it comes to handling pitches closer to the edges of the plate is to allow the pitch one ball's width outside of center to travel precisely one ball's width deep of the center pitch location, or behind the lead foot. If the pitch is two balls outside, two balls deep or behind the lead foot, and finally three balls outside, three balls deep or behind the lead foot.

The same concept would apply to pitches inside of the center contact position. One ball's width in, one ball's depth in front of the lead foot, two balls in, two balls in front of the lead foot, and finally three balls in, three balls in front of the lead foot. If this occurs, the batter will create "square contact" for each pitch location, resulting in optimal or maximum contact for each pitch.

With this understanding of what 'square contact' means as it relates to pitch location, creating a feel for the best exit angle on a pitch-to-pitch basis becomes much easier. It is even possible to practice these angles: for example, if a pitch is one ball's width inside of center, the optimal exit angle is 10 degrees for a baseball and 13 degrees for a softball (angle variance attributed to the difference in diameter of the balls). Each pitch location inside and outside of center will have precise and varying exit angles that can provide players and coaches with the opportunity to set up precise targets to aim for off the tee, during soft toss, and even during live batting practice.

Providing visual targets can help your team buy in to the concept of becoming a more complete offensive player. It also gives them instant feedback, which is something that this current generation of players is finding more and more desirable.

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Is The ‘Old School’ Method of Teaching Hitting Outdated?

Hi Charles Rachel Garcia Swing Test Experiment Recently, Rachel Garcia, an elite collegiate softball player (National Freshman of the year at UCLA) went through a simple before and after hitting analysis that I took a small part of and thought it might help to answer our question about 'Old School' teaching methods.  Rachel added 11 MPH in Tee Exit Velocity (Tee measures 'Raw' Power - no pitch influences), from 68 MPH to 79 MPH and increased her average Launch Angle from 5.4 degrees to 9.8 degrees in one 30 minute session.  In fact, her average Exit Velocity in her 'after' round was 5 MPH higher than her top speed in the first round.  The two most important metrics in hitting, Exit Velocity and Launch Angle, both increased significantly and immediately.  An elite athlete, seemingly already firing on all cylinders, adding 14% to her Exit Velocity.  How is this possible?   Elite performance and 'swing efficiency' are not the same things and it is possible to hit very well with slight swing inefficiencies.  We tend to look at elite players and just assume the reason they are elite is that their swing movements are perfect.  While she already had a good swing, there were some key mechanical movements that could become more efficient and thus the immediate increase.  ​​​​​​​ Read More Tomorrow look for a year end special on the Hitting Is A Guess - Time Training and all hitting  programs combined.............

GuessWorks, 41303 27th Street West, Palmdale, CA 93551, USA

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Study analyzes visual tracking strategies in baseball - UPI.com

http://perceptionaction.com/softfocus/

from upi.com

https://www.upi.com/Study-analyzes-visual-tracking-strategies-in-baseball/3351501861093/

Study analyzes visual tracking strategies in baseball

Aug. 4 (UPI) -- Researchers from Ohio State University's College of Optometry have found that batters change their visual tracking strategies depending on whether they swing or not.

The study, published in the August edition of Optometry and Vision Science, measured horizontal eye and head movements in two collegiate baseball players who were up to bat with a pitching machine.

Researchers found that patterns of head and eye movements are slightly different when batters are swinging compared to "taking" a pitch, meaning not swinging at a pitch.
The study tracked head movements in the baseball players by using an inertial sensor mounted on the players' helmets. Eye movements were tracked using a video eye tracker, both showed differences in tracking when swinging compared to not swinging at pitches.

The two batters followed a similar visual strategy in swinging and taking a pitch, however, when not swinging, they mainly moved their heads, not their eyes, toward the ball the majority of time the ball was in the air.

When the ball was about 150 milliseconds from arriving, the batters shifted their eyes ahead of the ball when it crossed the plate. 

"Large eye movements only occurred late in the pitch trajectory," the researchers said in a news release.

Conversely, when the batters were swinging at the ball, they followed a different visual strategy with head movements toward the ball being substantially larger than eye movements. The batters focused their eye on the ball up until about 50 milliseconds before it crossed the plate.

Researchers believe their findings support previous research that placing the gaze ahead of the ball is the optimal learning strategy and tracking the ball is the optimal hitting strategy.

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Hitting and the Power of Suggestion | FanGraphs Baseball

Good stuff from Fan Graphs. It illustrates why whether it's hitting (as in this article)  or. pitching verbal cues results may vary from player to player. So say good bye to the cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all approach and maybe soon the perfect pitching/hitting mechanics model. You'll have success with some players, but lose others but for want of a better verbal cue.

from the article: 

This fact, that there's no universal instruction for baseball development may be frustrating, but if you think about the difference from body to body, it makes sense. 

Ochart himself had some thoughts along these lines. "Coaching, in many aspects, is approached as an art more than a science because the same verbal cue to a group of athletes can cause unique movement adaptations within the group," he told me in an email. "Learning what an athlete feels has always been a critical part of coaching movement, and technology is helping us figure out exactly what's happening and bridging the critical gap between 'feel' and 'do.'"

from FanGraphs.com http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/hitting-and-the-power-of-suggestion/?utm_source=Driveline+Baseball+Newsletter&utm_campaign=6ef49e1d1a-Sunday_Thunder_Nuggets_12_18&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d541cdd9d2-6ef49e1d1a-311453553&mc_cid=6ef49e1d1a&mc_eid=48e9d48f3e

Hitting and the Power of Suggestion

I was drinking a beer with Kevin Youkilis — or rather, I was drinking one of his new brewery's beers, and he was drinking water — and we were talking about the state of the game. I think I mentioned something about chopping wood — how young players are coached (badly?) to hit down on the ball, and how that leads to a lot of swing and miss as players have to try to swing to a point in space — and he stopped me. "Nobody ever swings out to a specific point in space when they're told to chop wood or swing down on the ball," Youkilis said. "What actually happens is that they end up quicker to the ball." My mind was blown.

Youkilis pointed out that he spent his whole career with that philosophy, and though one player's strikeout rate (18.7%) and power (.197 isolated slugging percentage) don't prove anything, it was an eye opener for me. He basically was saying that the power of suggestion might actually have some value, even if the content of that suggestion was technically wrong. And once I thought about it, I realized I'd heard a few smart hitters — including Mark Trumbo — tell me something similar before, but I hadn't been listening right.

In any case, this is one of those testable situations with today's tools of the trade. I asked Jason Ochart of Driveline Baseball if he could create two situations and chart the outcomes using the data collection devices for which Driveline is famous on the pitching end.

In the first situation, Ochart told his hitter to be "quick to the ball." This is maybe not exactly the same thing as telling them to chop wood, but I didn't complain. I don't want him to tell his hitters something he doesn't want to tell them, and what he did tell them still permits us to (attempt to) answer our question: is it possible to change a hitter's swing metrics just by changing what you say to him?

In the second situation, Ochart gave his hitter the advice followed enthusiastically by modern hitters: "Get your hands to the slot first, and then swing." A fundamentally different coaching statement.

The results were different, too. In very interesting ways.

First, a table. Ochart used his Diamond Kinetics app to measure the player's swing by hand speed and distance in the zone. This player is a major-league baseball player.

Swing Stats for One Hitter, Two Conditions

Condition	Hand Speed	Distance in Zone
Quick to Ball	24 mph	23 inches
Hands to Slot	21 mph	28 inches

SOURCE: Diamond Kinetics / Driveline Baseball

Major league hitter told to be "quick to the ball' or "get hands to slot first" in two conditions.

For this hitter, the cue had an interesting result. Being quick to the ball was better for his bat speed, and bat speed begets power. However, he was in the zone for a shorter period, meaning that his swing was steeper and he was more likely to miss the ball. He wasn't giving his hands as much chance to get to the ball.

Here's what the two swings looked like, mapped by that Diamond Kinetics app. "Quick to the ball" is the green swing and "hands to slot" is in orange.

It looks like the "quick to the ball" cue compelled the batter to get his hands down to the slot faster! That might have cost him some time in the zone, though. And that missing time comes early on in the swing, when the brain may still have time to alter the path of the bat some.

The orange swing looks like it's better for a steeper launch angle, though, and that's something that the league's hitters have been seeking to do more over the last year-plus. Thanks to Bill Petti, we can see that baseball's hitter are hitting fewer balls in the 0 to -20 degree angles that produce poor outcomes. Maybe this is from more "hands to slot" coaching happening around the league, and maybe that coaching is due to analysis based on these Statcast stats.

Now it's time for a step back. We can't universalize this small finding to all players, not in a direct manner. What we can probably take from this is that coaching matters, and that each of these conditions is probably better for a specific swing. In other words, there are maybe powerful guys with good launch angle who could benefit from being told to be "quick to the ball." And maybe there other are guys with decent power but who need to lift the ball more; perhaps they'd benefit from being told to get the "hands to the slot" first.

This fact, that there's no universal instruction for baseball development may be frustrating, but if you think about the difference from body to body, it makes sense.

Ochart himself had some thoughts along these lines. "Coaching, in many aspects, is approached as an art more than a science because the same verbal cue to a group of athletes can cause unique movement adaptations within the group," he told me in an email. "Learning what an athlete feels has always been a critical part of coaching movement, and technology is helping us figure out exactly what's happening and bridging the critical gap between 'feel' and 'do.'"

And that's probably the perfect way to sum this up. Yes, it's probably not great to tell people to swing down on the ball. But if you take the kernel from that coaching, and tell them to be quick to the ball, you'll probably be saying the right thing to at least one type of hitter. Figuring out which type of hitter needs to hear which coaching is the next step.

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Why John Nash Matters, Rock-Paper Scissors, Pitch Sequencing and Hitting

This is why statistics if fun....the more you know, the more you have to learn.

from fivethirtyeight.com

http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/why-john-nash-matters/

Nash's 1951 article "Non-Cooperative Games" refined the definition of an "equilibrium" as a situation in which each player is employing a strategy that is optimal given the strategies of all the other players. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma — a game formalized by Nash's thesis adviser Albert W. Tucker — the two suspects betraying each other is an equilibrium, despite the best overall outcome being for both of them to remain silent. Nash's definition would (appropriately) become known as the "Nash Equilibrium" — a term familiar to students in a wide range of academic disciplines.

Given this new definition, Nash was able to prove that a "mixed-strategy" equilibrium exists for virtually any finite game. A "mixed" strategy is one where, instead of choosing a single action, a player chooses a mix of actions with a certain probability for each — for example, the strategy of choosing rock, paper or scissors one-third of the time each in Rock Paper Scissors. It doesn't matter if your opponent knows what strategy you're playing, they can't do anything about it.

One area in which Nash's legacy continues to be especially relevant and fruitful is sports analysis. One of the cleanest examples is the mini-game of penalty kicks in soccer. If a player always kicks the same direction, the goalkeeper can profitably adapt by always diving in that direction. Thus "always kick right" or "always kick left" can't be equilibrium strategies. Similarly, if the goalkeeper always dived in one direction, the player would be able to profitably deviate by kicking in the other. Thus the equilibrium strategy for the kicking player is to "mix it up" (use a mixed strategy) by kicking one way some of the time and the other way some of the time. Presuming the player selects randomly and doesn't telegraph his moves, the goalkeeper can do no better than guessing. Therefore, the goalkeeper's equilibrium response is to also mix it up, diving in each direction often enough to keep the kicker from exploiting his tendencies. This is why you often see wildly inaccurate dives: It's not necessarily because they were faked out, it's just that they picked scissors when the striker picked rock.

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http://makenolittleplans.net/a-new-view-on-pitch-sequencing/

A NEW VIEW ON PITCH SEQUENCING

The core of baseball is the duel between pitcher and batter.  The pitcher's job is to throw a baseball past the batter, or otherwise induce the batter to make an out (via a weakly hit ball, for instance).  The batter's job is the opposite: to make solid contact with the ball, transferring enough force to either cause the batted ball to be difficult to field (e.g. a line drive) or impossible to field (a home run).

An interesting aspect of this battle between pitcher and batter is the fact that the batter can, in theory, hit any pitch within the strike zone (at the major league level).  It is straightforward physics to reason that, given enough information, a batter can make good contact with any strike, and indeed, MLB hitters can get hits from even 100+ mph fastballs (albeit rarely).

The fastest pitches still take about four-tenths of a second to go from hand to plate, which is more than enough time to swing.  I would argue that the crucial weapon the pitcher has in his arsenal isn't speed, it's uncertainty.  If a pitcher can cause a batter to adjust their swing mid-cut, or not swing at all, that is a vastly more powerful advantage than the milliseconds that can be chopped off by simply throwing harder.

For the remainder of this post, I'll investigate how pitchers utilize uncertainty in their pitch sequences.  MGL has hypothesized (or perhaps has data to show?) that pitchers optimize their sequencing of pitches such that the identity of the first pitch in a sequence gives no information as to the identity of the next pitch.  That is to say, conditional on the first pitch being, say, a fastball, the batter has no more idea of what the next pitch will be than he did before the first pitch.

 Baseball Prospectus | The Art and Science of Sequencing

				Baseball Prospectus | The Art and Science of Sequencing A first foray into one of baseball's most murky subjects.
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Pitch sequencing has long lurked as a sort of terra incognita in sabermetric analysis. It's something that all baseball folks agree is important, but it's proved mostly impenetrable to strictly quantitative approaches. There's an intuitive sense that sequencing must be one of the crucial determinants of pitcher success, and although we can seemingly identify a good sequence when we see one, any attempt to apply a universal criterion of good sequencing across all pitches (or pitchers) is much more challenging. The rest of this article will be devoted to applying just such a criterion, and determining whether it is of any practical utility in understanding pitching generally.

There are at least two schools of thought about pitch sequencing. On the one hand, there seems to be an appreciation for sequences that mix up locations, speeds, and breaks in unpredictable ways, on the grounds that those kinds of sequences ought to be the most challenging for a hitter. On the other hand, Mitchel Lichtman (aka MGL) has argued forcefully on the basis of game theory that the ideal sequencing would be something like weighted randomness (weighted, that is, by the quality of each pitch). MGL's argument says that if a pitcher tried too hard to mix things up, for instance by purposefully not throwing two of the same pitch in a row, he would end up tipping the next pitch to the batter, resulting in a powerful disadvantage.

I believe that it's instructive to consider an analogy to rock-paper-scissors. Any player of rock-paper-scissors knows that it's best not to establish any predictable tendencies. Should a player begin to always follow his "rocks" with "papers," it becomes a trivial exercise to counter with "scissors." This line of argument represents the weighted randomness school of MGL. On the other hand, very sophisticated players of rock-paper-scissors can predict patterns in novices or observe them in experts; countering these subtle tendencies may involve nonrandom usage of the various symbols (i.e. rock/paper/scissors). By analogy, this latter strategy would represent the more classical school of sequencing.

It's important to note that these two schools are not necessarily contradictory, even though they appear to be at first glance. A pitcher may be carefully crafting his sequences in a single game or against a certain batter or team—in short, on a small scale. However, these individual sequences may all even out at the scope of a full season, yielding MGL's pattern of randomness. To that point, an important caveat for the following is that I will look at sequencing at the level of a whole season (in order to maximize sample size). But if there are interesting patterns at the scale of individual games or months or at-bats, they'll have to wait for further analysis.

.....

Sequencing in Context
It's tough to imagine Joey Votto at the plate taking the logarithms of the frequencies of four-seam fastballs in order to predict the next pitch. But then again, maybe he doesn't have to; maybe it's the job of some poor scout in the Reds' front office to pick out pitch sequence tendencies, and Votto merely knows which two pitches to look for such that the next pitch is easily predictable. Maybe, too, Votto gets a hunch once in a while, an intuition or a feeling, that directs him to be aware of the possibility of a slider more than another pitch.

That constant struggle to predict the pitcher's next move forces the pitcher to vary his repertoire as much as he is able, given the count and the quality of his pitches. Yet, perhaps because of those constraints, no pitcher approaches the theoretical optimum of perfectly random sequencing. Returning again to the dichotomous schools of sequencing, I think my results provide something for both sides to appreciate. On the one hand, lower mutual information correlates with better pitchers (though causation is much more difficult to pin down). On the other, even when the outcome is favorable to the pitcher, pitchers aggressively structure their sequences. The results are therefore somewhat inconclusive.

There remains much to be investigated. As mentioned above, this view on sequencing ignores one of the most crucial sources of uncertainty in pitching, namely location. Understanding location in the context of entropy is very tricky, but necessary, and I'll look to tackle that in the future. In addition, there's an entire other party in calling pitches to whom I've given little mention: the catcher. Which catchers sequence well, and which poorly? Finally, it would be desirable to connect individual sequences of pitches to good or bad results, looking for situations in which pitchers establish predictable sequences and are then punished. So look upon this article as a first foray into a previously unexplored area of sabermetrics, one in which there appears to be much more to be discovered on account of the fact that there's so little known.

Robert Arthur is an author of Baseball Prospectus.   
Click here to see Robert's other articles. You can contact Robert by Baseball Prospectus | | Contact Us

from Business Insider:

http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-beat-anyone-at-rock-paper-scissors-2014-5

The question of how to win at Rock-Paper-Scissors has, believe it or not, plagued mathematicians and game theorists for quite some time. While they previously had devised a theoretical answer to the question, a new experiment by Zhijian Wang at Zhejiang University in China that used real players, has revealed an interesting wrinkle to the original theory.

In the experiment, Zhijian noticed that winning players tended  to stick with their winning strategy, while losers tended to switch to the next strategy in the sequence of rock-paper-scissors, following, what he calls, “persistent cyclic flows.”

Here's how it works in practice: Player A and Player B both start by using random strategies. If Player A uses rock and Player B uses paper, Player A loses. In the next round, Player A can assume that Player B will use paper again and should therefore use scissors to win. In the round after that, because Player B lost, Player A can assume that Player B will use the next strategy in the sequence — scissors — and Player A should then use rock, thus winning again. 

If you take the game on a theoretical level, the most mathematically sound way to play Rock-Paper-Scissors is by choosing your strategy at random. Because there are three outcomes — a win, a loss, or a tie — and each strategy has one other strategy that it can beat and one other strategy that can beat it, and we don’t care what strategy we win with, it makes the most sense to pick paper exactly 1/3 of the time, rock 1/3 of the time, and scissors 1/3 of the time. This is called the game's Nash equilibrium. 

While the Nash Equilibrium should be the best strategy in real life, Zhijian found a decidedly different pattern when he and some other researchers recruited 72 students to play the game. They divided the students into 12 groups of six players and had them each play 300 rounds of Rock-Paper-Scissors against each other. Zhijian also added a payout in proportion to the number of victories.

Harrison Jacobs





Losing players choose the next strategy in the sequence.

When Zhijian reviewed the results he found that students chose each strategy close to one third of the time, suggesting the Nash Equilibrium theory. However, when he looked closer, he noticed a more unusual pattern.

The pattern that Zhijian discovered — winners repeating their strategy and losers moving to the next strategy in the sequence — is called a “conditional response” in game theory. The researchers have theorized that the response may be hard-wired into the brain, a question they intend to investigate with further experiments.

For now, Zhijian suggests that exploiting the knowledge that most people use the conditional strategy may result in winning a lot more games of Rock-Paper-Scissors. 

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-beat-anyone-at-rock-paper-scissors-2014-5#ixzz3bGpjEAa3

from NY Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/science/rock-paper-scissors.html?_r=0

Rock-Paper-Scissors: You vs. the Computer

Computers mimic human reasoning by building on simple rules and statistical averages. Test your strategy against the computer in this rock-paper-scissors game illustrating basic artificial intelligence. Choose from two different modes: novice, where the computer learns to play from scratch, and veteran, where the computer pits over 200,000 rounds of previous experience against you.

 Note: A truly random game of rock-paper-scissors would result in a statistical tie with each player winning, tying and losing one-third of the time. However, people are not truly random and thus can be studied and analyzed. While this computer won't win all rounds, over time it can exploit a person's tendencies and patterns to gain an advantage over its opponent.

Rock-Paper-Scissors: You vs. the Computer

				Rock-Paper-Scissors: You vs. the Computer Test your strategy against the computer in this rock-paper-scissors game illustrating basic artificial intelligence.
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SMARTER THAN YOU THINK

Rock-Paper-Scissors: You vs. the Computer

http://www.worldrps.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=256&Itemid=37

How to beat anyone at Rock Paper Scissors

RPS News and Notes

With the 2006 World Rock Paper Scissors Championships coming up in November in Toronto and $10,000.00 on the line (not to mention bragging rights of being able to call yourself "World Champion of RPS"), trying to get some sort of edge on your competition is becoming a focal point for a lot of players.

Little bit of background. Contrary to what you might think RPS is not simply a game of luck or chance. While it is true that from a mathematical perspective the 'optimum' strategy is to play randomly, it still is not a winning strategy for two reasons. First, 'optimum' in this case means you should win, lose and draw an equal number of times (hardly a winning strategy over the long term). Second, Humans, try as they might, are terrible at trying to be random, in fact often humans in trying to approximate randomness become quite predictable. So knowing that there is always something motivating your opponent's actions, there are a couple of tricks and techniques that you can use to tip the balance in your favour.

The secret to winning at RPS

Basically, there are two ways to win at RPS. First is to take one throw away from your opponent options. ie - If you can get your opponent to not play rock, then you can safely go with scissors as it will win against paper and stalemate against itself. Seems impossible right? Not if you know the subtle ways you can manipulate someone. The art is to not let them know you are eliminating one of their options. The second way is...READ MORE

With the 2006 World Rock Paper Scissors Championships coming up in November in Toronto and $10,000.00 on the line (not to mention bragging rights of being able to call yourself "World Champion of RPS"), trying to get some sort of edge on your competition is becoming a focal point for a lot of players.

Little bit of background. Contrary to what you might think RPS is not simply a game of luck or chance. While it is true that from a mathematical perspective the 'optimum' strategy is to play randomly, it still is not a winning strategy for two reasons. First, 'optimum' in this case means you should win, lose and draw an equal number of times (hardly a winning strategy over the long term). Second, Humans, try as they might, are terrible at trying to be random, in fact often humans in trying to approximate randomness become quite predictable. So knowing that there is always something motivating your opponent's actions, there are a couple of tricks and techniques that you can use to tip the balance in your favour.

The secret to winning at RPS

Basically, there are two ways to win at RPS. First is to take one throw away from your opponent options. ie - If you can get your opponent to not play rock, then you can safely go with scissors as it will win against paper and stalemate against itself. Seems impossible right? Not if you know the subtle ways you can manipulate someone. The art is to not let them know you are eliminating one of their options. The second way is to force you opponent into making a predictable move. Obviously, the key is that it has to be done without them realizing that you are manipulating them.

Most of the following techniques use variations on these basic principles. How well it works for you depends upon how well you can subtly manipulate your opponent without them figuring out what you are doing. So, now that  the background is out of the way, let's get into these techniques:

Lead on Banner 1 - Rock is for Rookies

In RPS circles a common mantra is "Rock is for Rookies" because males have a tendency to lead with Rock on their opening throw. It has a lot to do with idea that Rock is perceived as "strong" and forceful", so guys tend to fall back on it. Use this knowledge to take an easy first win by playing Paper. This tactic is best done in pedestrian matches against someone who doesn't play that much and generally won't work in tournament play.

2 - Scissors on First

The second step in the 'Rock is for Rookies' line of thinking is to play scissors as your opening move against a more experienced player. Since you know they won't come out with rock (since it is too obvious), scissors is your obvious safe move to win against paper or stalemate to itself.

3 - The Double Run

When playing with someone who is not experienced at the RPS, look out for double runs or in other words, the same throw twice. When this happens you can safely eliminate that throw and guarantee yourself at worst a stalemate in the next game. So, when you see a two-Scissor run, you know their next move will be Rock or Paper, so Paper is your best move. Why does this work? People hate being predictable and the perceived hallmark of predictability is to come out with the same throw three times in row.

4 - Telegraph Your Throw

Tell your opponent what you are going to throw and then actually throw what you said. Why? As long as you are not playing someone who actually thinks you are bold enough to telegraph your throw and then actually deliver it, you can eliminate the throw that beats the throw you are telegraphing. So, if you announce rock, your opponent won't play paper which means coming out with that scissors will give you at worst a stalemate and at best the win.

5 - Step Ahead Thinking

Don't know what to do for your next throw? Try playing the throw that would have lost to your opponents last throw? Sounds weird  but it works more often than not, why? Inexperienced (or flustered) players will often subconsciously deliver the throw that beat their last one. Therefore, if your opponent played paper, they will very often play Scissors, so you go Rock. This is a good tactic in a stalemate situation or when your opponent lost their last game. It is not as successful after a player has won the last game as they are generally in a more confident state of mind which causes them to be more active in choosing their next throw.

Lead on Banner

6 - Suggest A Throw

When playing against someone who asks you to remind them about the rules, take the opportunity to subtly "suggest a throw" as you explain to them by physically showing them the throw you want them to play. ie  "Paper beats Rock, Rock beats scissors (show scissors), Scissors (show scissors again) beats paper." Believe it or not, when people are not paying attention their subconscious mind will often accept your "suggestion".  A very similar technique is used by magicians to get someone to take a specific card from the deck.

7 - When All Else Fails Go With Paper

Haven't a clue what to throw next? Then go with Paper. Why? Statistically, in competition play, it has been observed that scissors is thrown the least often. Specifically, it gets delivered 29.6% of the time, so it slightly under-indexes against the expected average of 33.33% by 3.73%. Obviously, knowing this only gives you a slight advantage, but in a situation where you just don't know what to do, even a slight edge is better than none at all.

8 - The Rounder's Ploy

This technique falls into more of a 'cheating' category, but if you have no honour and can live with yourself the next day, you can use it to get an edge. The way it works is when you suggest a game with someone, make no mention of the number of rounds you are going to play. Play the first match and if you win, take it is as a win. If you lose, without missing a beat start playing the 'next' round on the assumption that it was a best 2 out of 3. No doubt you will hear protests from your opponent but stay firm and remind them that 'no one plays best of one for a kind of decision that you two are making'. No this devious technique won't guarantee you the win, but it will give you a chance to battle back to even and start again.

About the author: Graham Walker

As a co-author of the Official Rock Paper Scissors Strategy Guide (published by Simon and Schuster) and five-time organizer of the World Rock Paper Scissors Championships, Graham Walker is one of the few people who is actually a credible authority on the strategy and cultural significance on the game of Rock Paper Scissors.