Kansas City Royals: Resourceful or reckless? | Beyond the Box Score

I would come down on the resourceful side. The recklessness is a perceptual matter, a side effect of employing game strategy that underdogs need to employ to beat favorites. As Malcolm Gladwell illustrates in his article referenced below, it's how David beats Goliath, which is with unconventional strategies or surprise. If you play a so-called "superior" opponent, one that on paper is better than you, you don't play them straight up, you gamble, you change tempo or pace, you take them off their game.

from Beyond the Box Score:

Kansas City Royals: Resourceful or reckless? - Beyond the Box Score:

Entering the bottom of the eighth inning in the Wild Card game, the Royals had about a three percent chance of winning. Clearly, they defied the odds in that game, and chances are the Royals will win the ALDS -- it will be very difficult for the Angels to overcome a 0-2 deficit, especially with the next two games in Kansas City. Ned Yost is effectively playing with house money, as just about every steal and sac bunt the Royals have attempted turned out their way.

Historical percentages suggest this level of success can't be maintained, but if the Royals continue to have success with these plays, the odds won't matter -- success or failure dictates the odds and not the other way around. The Royals are winning with their brand of baseball, and if that success can be sustained, they can go a long way. The odds suggest the success can't be sustained -- so don't tell them the odds.

'via Blog this'

Some of this is simply the nature of how the SABR-rattlers, that currently control the narrative as far as "How the Game is Supposed to be Played", view the game. This domain used to be the stomping grounds of grizzled, old "baseball men". Now it's the domain of math geeks with pocket protectors. When the game doesn't go quite the way that their spreadsheets tell them it should they go "TILT" and scream "That does not compute, that does not compute". 

To them, luck is not the residue of design, it is the differential between the "expected result" and the "actual result". They don't understand and cannot compute that illusive quality called "chemistry" which is simply that, on some teams, talent is greater than the sum of the parts. There is a residual benefit to having a team where each player is put in roles that they can execute and allow other players to fulfill their roles without having to extend or do too much. They dismiss chemistry by saying "winning breeds chemistry". That's not true at all.

They make the mistake of viewing chemistry of guys all getting along and singing Kum Ba Yah by the campfire. That's not it at all. The Oakland A's had chemistry in the Charlie Finley days and they didn't all just get along. But they had chemistry. The Bronx Zoo Yankees had chemistry, but they didn't all get along to well. Guys played complimentary roles which allowed the stars to shine without having to do too much. It's an elusive quality and you can have it on teams as diverse as the "We are Family" Pirates as well as the Bronx Zoo Yankees.

This year, it explains why the two wild-card teams are still playing while the teams that are better on paper ( and better looking on spreadsheets ) are sitting at home watching. It's not luck. It's chemistry. Maybe the math geeks need to widen their horizons and take a science course.

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How David Beats Goliath:

http://blog.laughlin.com/2009/07/17/increasing-your-odds-by-rethinking-the-rules/

A great Malcolm Gladwell article titled How David Beats Goliath references a study done by political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft. Toft studied 200 years of “asymmetric conflicts” on the battlefield. As a lifelong fan of the underdog, I was curious about the numbers behind the “itʼs why they play the game” adage. It turned out David may just be the new Goliath. Three things jumped out:

Power is good, but itʼs no guarantee. Davidʼs odds werenʼt as bad as youʼd think. Of the 200 conflicts studied between 1800-2003, David won 28.5% of the time.

The times (and odds) are changing. Between 1800-49, the stronger side won 88% of the conflicts studied. That number dropped to 80% between 1850-99 and dropped (again) to 65% between 1900-49. Between 1950-99, it dropped, wait for it, to only 49%. Now, on average, the strong side possessed ten times the power – where “power” is measured in terms of armed forces and population – than their adversaries. And between the years 1950-99, they lost more than they won.

Itʼs about making your own rules. Why would you play by the rules that Goliath has already won on (see: Google)? When a David wins, it tends to do so by changing the rules. In his study, Toft found that by choosing an unconventional strategy, the underdogʼs winning percentage went from 28.5% to 63.6%.

Your Big Doubts About the 10,000 Hour Rule Are Well-Founded | Library of Economics and Liberty

Great stuff on the Nature versus Nurture debate, the Ten Thousand Hour Rule and more from what may seem like an unlikely source, the Library of Economics and Liberty. BTW this site and this article demonstrates my theory that you can judge a site by the quality of the comments in the comments section and this site is top notch, top quality and first class all the way. Therefore, it is appropriately bookmarked and highly recommended.


Your Big Doubts About the 10,000 Hour Rule Are Well-Founded | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty

				Your Big Doubts About the 10,000 Hour Rule Are Well-F... Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer's
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Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer's "The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance" (PSYCHOLOGICAL Review 1993) isn't just one of the most famous articles in the history of academic PSYCHOLOGY.  Thanks to Malcolm Gladwell's Outliers, the article's bullet points are now famous around the globe.  It is from this article and related RESEARCH the Gladwell distills his "10,000 Hour Rule."

What does the 10,000 Hour Rule really say?  A few caveats aside, the Rule says that 10,000 hours of deliberate practice is both necessary and sufficient for world-class expertise.  Listen, for example, to Gladwell talk about musical expertise.

The striking thing about Ericsson's study is that he and his colleagues couldn't find any "naturals," musicians who floated effortlessly to the top while practicing a fraction of the time their peers did. Nor could they find any "grinds," people who worked harder than everyone else, yet just didn't have what it takes to break the top ranks. Their research suggests that once a musician has enough ability to get into a top MUSIC SCHOOL, the thing that distinguishes one performer from another is how hard he or she works. That's it. And what's more, the people at the very top don't work just harder or even much harder than everyone else. They work much, much harder.

This may seem like journalistic hyperbole, but it's quite close to the original RESEARCH.  Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Romer:

Contrary to the popular "talent" view that asserts that differences in practice and experience cannot account for differences in expert performance, we have shown that the amount of a specific type of activity (deliberate practice) is consistently correlated with a wide range of performance including expert-level performance, when appropriate developmental differences (age) are controlled. Because of the high costs to the individuals and their environments of engaging in high levels of deliberate practice and the overlap in characteristics of deliberate practice and other known effective training situations, one can infer that high levels of deliberate practice arenecessary to attain expert level performance. Our theoretical framework can also provide a sufficient account of the major facts about the NATURE and scarcity of exceptional performance. [emphasis mine]

And:

We attribute the dramatic differences in performance between experts and amateurs-novices to similarly large differences in the recorded amounts of deliberate practice. Furthermore, we can account for stable individual differences in performance among individuals actively involved in deliberate practice with reference to the monotonic relation between accumulated amount of deliberate practice and current level of performance.

Although I've found great value in Ericsson's research, his skepticism about innate talent always struck me as crazy.  Yes, experts energetically hone their crafts.  But everywhere I look, I see Gladwell's "naturals" - people who are good despite relatively little time investment - and "grinds" - people who are mediocre despite massive time investment.  Only recently, though, did I discover a pile of researchthat confirms my big doubts about the 10,000 Hour Rule.  Highlights of the highlights:

More than 20 years ago, researchers proposed that individual differences in performance in such domains as music, sports, and games largely reflect individual differences in amount of deliberate practice, which was defined as engagement in structured activities created specifically to improve performance in a domain. This view is a frequent topic of popular science writing--but is IT SUPPORTED by empirical evidence? To answer this question, we conducted a meta-analysis covering all major domains in which deliberate practice has been investigated. We found that deliberate practice explained 26% of the variance in performance for games, 21% for music, 18% for sports, 4% for education, and less than 1% for professions. We conclude that deliberate practice is important, but not as important as has been argued.

The case of chess:

On average, deliberate practice explained 34% of the reliable variance in chess performance, leaving 66% unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors. We conclude that deliberate practice is not sufficient to account for individual differences in chess performance. The implication of this conclusion is that some people require much less deliberate practice than other people to reach an elite level of performance in chess. We illustrate this point in Fig. 2 using Gobet and Campitelli's (2007) chess SAMPLE, with the 90 players classified based on their chess ratings as "master" (≥2200, n = 16), "expert" (≥2000, n = 31), or "intermediate" (<2000, n = 43). There were large differences in mean amount of deliberate practice across the skill groups: master M = 10,530 h (SD = 7414), expert M = 5673 h (SD = 4654), and intermediate M = 3179 h (SD = 4615). However, as the SDs suggest, there were very large ranges of deliberate practice within skill groups. For example, the range for the masters was 832 to 24,284 h--a difference of nearly three orders of magnitude. Furthermore, there was overlap in distributions between skill groups. For example, of the 16 masters, 31.3% (n = 5) had less deliberate practice than the mean of the expert group, one skill level down, and 12.5% (n = 2) had less deliberate practice than the mean of the intermediate group, two skill levels down. In the other direction, of the 31 intermediates, 25.8% (n = 8) had more deliberate practice than the mean of the expert group, one skill level up, and 12.9% (n = 4) had more deliberate practice than the mean of the master group, two skill levels up.

The figure:

The case of music:

On average across studies, deliberate practice explained about 30% of the reliable variance in music performance, leaving about 70% unexplained and potentially explainable by other factors. We conclude that deliberate practice is not sufficient to account for individual differences in music performance. Results of other studies provide further support for this conclusion. Simonton (1991) found a large amount of variability in the amount of time it took famous classical composers to have their first "hit," and that the interval between the first composition and the first hit correlated significantly and negatively with maximum annual output, lifetime productivity, and posthumous reputation. Composers who rose to fame quickly-the most "talented"-had the most successful careers. Furthermore, Sloboda, Davidson, Howe, and Moore (1996) noted that although students at a selective MUSIC SCHOOL ("high achievers") had accumulated more "formal practice" than students who were learning an instrument at a non-music school ("pleasure players"), there were some individuals at each skill level (grade) who did "less than 20 per cent of the mean amount of practice for that grade" and others who did "over four times as much practice than average to attain a given grade" (p. 301).

If deliberate practice doesn't explain everything, what does?  Lots of stuff.  Starting age.  IQ. PERSONALITY.  Specific cognitive skills, too.  Consider working memory:

Ericsson and colleagues have argued that measures of working memory capacity themselves reflect acquired skills (Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), but working memory capacity and deliberate practice correlated near zero in this STUDY (r = .003). There was also no evidence for a Deliberate Practice × Working Memory Capacity interaction, indicating that working memory capacity was no less important a predictor of performance for pianists with thousands of hours of deliberate practice than it was for beginners.  

Fortunately, we can salvage most of the original RESEARCH behind the 10,000 Hour Rule.  Instead of thinking of 10,000 hours of deliberate practice as a mandatory minimum for expertise, take it as a rule of thumb: On average, a world-class expert has to practice for about 10,000 hours to reach the top.  Instead of thinking of 10,000 hours as a guarantee of expertise, adopt a pluralistic and probabilistic approach: 10,000 hours combined with lots of innate talent will usuallytake you to the top.

Most importantly, though, think of deliberate practice as a general THEORY ofimprovement, not a special THEORY of expertise!  Some people learn more much easily than others.  But almost anyone can improve in almost anything.  How?  By deliberately practicing the specific skills they wish to improve.  RESEARCH on deliberate practice doesn't undermine intelligence research by showing that genius is a myth.  Instead it reinforces Transfer of Learning research by showing that learning is highly specific.

HT: GMU econ prodigy Nathaniel Bechhofer

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Science aid: Nature versus Nurture

				Science aid: Nature versus Nurture Is intelligence caused by nature (genetics) or nurture (how you are raised/the environment)? Look at twin, adoption and selective breeding studies to com...
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Nature versus Nurture

In this article we will be exploring the age-old nature or nurture debate: which is more relevant; your genes or how you are bought up. This particular article will be concerned with inteligence.

Evolution and Genetics

Firstly, what is evolution? It is a process where the creatures that are best adapted to survive will live longer and therefore be able to reproduce more and have a greater number of offspring. Many of these offspring will have this characteristic and over the course of many generations all in that species will have this characteristic.

It can be defined briefly as: a gradual change in a species over time because of a natural selection of the best adapted to an environment.

Now we move on to a simple look at genetics. As you know, we have genes which give us different characteristics and these genes are inherited from our parents. The actualgenetic code is known as the genotype. However, you get one gene from each parent for everything, but obviously only one of these can be expressed; so how the genes actaully manifest themselves is called the phenotype.

Twin Studies

A twin study is one of the method used. There are two types of twin: dizygotic (DZ) who are regular fraternal twins; and then monozygotic (MZ) which are identical twins and so have exactly the same DNA as each other, i.e. the genotypes are identical. The table below summarizes what the various findings would mean.

In particular it is useful to look at MZ twins (since there genetics are the same) who have been raised together or apart. This was done by Shields (1962), and found the correlation between inteligences of MZ growing up together was 0.83 and growing up apart was 0.51. This would appear to show the environment is more important, however there are some methodological issues related to this study.

A correlation shows how two things are related, but don't give a definite reason. Also, it is only recently that we can prove two twins are identical, it could be that DZ twins that looked very similar were included because they thought they were identical. And finally there is the issue of what was counted as 'seperated' in the study, some twins were included who were raised but different family members but lived near to each other, regually saw each other and went to the same school.

............

Conclusion

Very sorry to dissappoint you, but the conclusion is that both nature and nurture play an important role, however perhaps that the environment is the deciding factor.

The idea used to describe it is the Rubber Band Hypothesis. It says that the potential (length of the band) is decided by genetics. However the environment stretches this band, so that someone with a low potential could be stretched beyond someone with a high because of environmental differences. However if someone with a high and someone with a lower genetic potential had the same environment, that person with the higher genetic potential would be able to 'stretch' their intelligence to a higher level.

10,000 Hours vs. The Sports Gene - MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference

I wish I could have attended this event. I'm not sure I had the requisite IQ to get in the door, but this breakout features a comparison of the recent book The Sports Gene by David Epstein (highly recommended) versus the arguments presented in The Talent Code. 

Once again, much like the Moneyball debate of "stats vs. scouts"  I think the nature vs. nurture, genetics vs. hard work is a false argument. It's not one or the other, but an elegant interplay of both sides of the argument. Enjoy. 

10,000 Hours vs. The Sports Gene | MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference

			10,000 Hours vs. The Sports Gene | MIT Sloan Sports Anal... Annual conference on sports analytics organized by the MIT Sloan School of Management.
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Many impactful innovations in sport and beyond were created by visionaries that dared to think differently. Finding a new and radical way of approaching a traditional task – one that may even run counter to conventional wisdom – is risky but potentially "game changing" too. This panel will bring together the pioneers who have found success by challenging the status quo in their field. The discussion will focus on questions such as: What seeded the initial idea for change? Who inspired them? How did they overcome obstacles and gain buy-in to their vision? Once established, how does one continue to innovate in the face of new imitators? And, what is the next great opportunity for innovation? 

David Epstein - The Sports Gene