I would come down on the resourceful side. The recklessness is a perceptual matter, a side effect of employing game strategy that underdogs need to employ to beat favorites. As Malcolm Gladwell illustrates in his article referenced below, it's how David beats Goliath, which is with unconventional strategies or surprise. If you play a so-called "superior" opponent, one that on paper is better than you, you don't play them straight up, you gamble, you change tempo or pace, you take them off their game.
Some of this is simply the nature of how the SABR-rattlers, that currently control the narrative as far as "How the Game is Supposed to be Played", view the game. This domain used to be the stomping grounds of grizzled, old "baseball men". Now it's the domain of math geeks with pocket protectors. When the game doesn't go quite the way that their spreadsheets tell them it should they go "TILT" and scream "That does not compute, that does not compute".
To them, luck is not the residue of design, it is the differential between the "expected result" and the "actual result". They don't understand and cannot compute that illusive quality called "chemistry" which is simply that, on some teams, talent is greater than the sum of the parts. There is a residual benefit to having a team where each player is put in roles that they can execute and allow other players to fulfill their roles without having to extend or do too much. They dismiss chemistry by saying "winning breeds chemistry". That's not true at all.
They make the mistake of viewing chemistry of guys all getting along and singing Kum Ba Yah by the campfire. That's not it at all. The Oakland A's had chemistry in the Charlie Finley days and they didn't all just get along. But they had chemistry. The Bronx Zoo Yankees had chemistry, but they didn't all get along to well. Guys played complimentary roles which allowed the stars to shine without having to do too much. It's an elusive quality and you can have it on teams as diverse as the "We are Family" Pirates as well as the Bronx Zoo Yankees.
This year, it explains why the two wild-card teams are still playing while the teams that are better on paper ( and better looking on spreadsheets ) are sitting at home watching. It's not luck. It's chemistry. Maybe the math geeks need to widen their horizons and take a science course.
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How David Beats Goliath:
from Beyond the Box Score:
Entering the bottom of the eighth inning in the Wild Card game, the Royals had about a three percent chance of winning. Clearly, they defied the odds in that game, and chances are the Royals will win the ALDS -- it will be very difficult for the Angels to overcome a 0-2 deficit, especially with the next two games in Kansas City. Ned Yost is effectively playing with house money, as just about every steal and sac bunt the Royals have attempted turned out their way.
Historical percentages suggest this level of success can't be maintained, but if the Royals continue to have success with these plays, the odds won't matter -- success or failure dictates the odds and not the other way around. The Royals are winning with their brand of baseball, and if that success can be sustained, they can go a long way. The odds suggest the success can't be sustained -- so don't tell them the odds.
Some of this is simply the nature of how the SABR-rattlers, that currently control the narrative as far as "How the Game is Supposed to be Played", view the game. This domain used to be the stomping grounds of grizzled, old "baseball men". Now it's the domain of math geeks with pocket protectors. When the game doesn't go quite the way that their spreadsheets tell them it should they go "TILT" and scream "That does not compute, that does not compute".
To them, luck is not the residue of design, it is the differential between the "expected result" and the "actual result". They don't understand and cannot compute that illusive quality called "chemistry" which is simply that, on some teams, talent is greater than the sum of the parts. There is a residual benefit to having a team where each player is put in roles that they can execute and allow other players to fulfill their roles without having to extend or do too much. They dismiss chemistry by saying "winning breeds chemistry". That's not true at all.
They make the mistake of viewing chemistry of guys all getting along and singing Kum Ba Yah by the campfire. That's not it at all. The Oakland A's had chemistry in the Charlie Finley days and they didn't all just get along. But they had chemistry. The Bronx Zoo Yankees had chemistry, but they didn't all get along to well. Guys played complimentary roles which allowed the stars to shine without having to do too much. It's an elusive quality and you can have it on teams as diverse as the "We are Family" Pirates as well as the Bronx Zoo Yankees.
This year, it explains why the two wild-card teams are still playing while the teams that are better on paper ( and better looking on spreadsheets ) are sitting at home watching. It's not luck. It's chemistry. Maybe the math geeks need to widen their horizons and take a science course.
===
How David Beats Goliath:
http://blog.laughlin.com/2009/07/17/increasing-your-odds-by-rethinking-the-rules/
A great Malcolm Gladwell article titled How David Beats Goliath references a study done by political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft. Toft studied 200 years of “asymmetric conflicts” on the battlefield. As a lifelong fan of the underdog, I was curious about the numbers behind the “itʼs why they play the game” adage. It turned out David may just be the new Goliath. Three things jumped out:
Power is good, but itʼs no guarantee. Davidʼs odds werenʼt as bad as youʼd think. Of the 200 conflicts studied between 1800-2003, David won 28.5% of the time.
The times (and odds) are changing. Between 1800-49, the stronger side won 88% of the conflicts studied. That number dropped to 80% between 1850-99 and dropped (again) to 65% between 1900-49. Between 1950-99, it dropped, wait for it, to only 49%. Now, on average, the strong side possessed ten times the power – where “power” is measured in terms of armed forces and population – than their adversaries. And between the years 1950-99, they lost more than they won.
Itʼs about making your own rules. Why would you play by the rules that Goliath has already won on (see: Google)? When a David wins, it tends to do so by changing the rules. In his study, Toft found that by choosing an unconventional strategy, the underdogʼs winning percentage went from 28.5% to 63.6%.
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